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INTERSTATE RIGHTS TO THE WATERS OF 

THE CONNECTICUT RIVER: ISSUES 

RAISED BY THE PROPOSED 





The Metropolitan District Commission (MDC), an agency of 
the Commonwealth of Massachusetts,1 is currently preparing an en­
vironmental impact report on its proposed diversion of water from 
the Connecticut River2 into the water supplies of Boston and forty­
three other Massachusetts communities.3 The proposal, generally 
called the Northfield diversion, would employ the pumping capacity 
of an existing hydroelectric power station to withdraw up to 375 mil­
lion gallons of water daily from the river during periods of relatively 
high fiow.4 The water would be channeled from the power station 
reservoir through an aqueduct to Quabbin Reservoir (Quabbin), the 
• Clerk to Hon. Kent B. Smith, Massachusetts Appeals Court; Member of the 
Massachusetts Bar; B.A., Brown University, 1972; M.A., Tufts University, 1973; J.D., 
Western New England College School of Law, 1982. 
I. The MDC is an agency of the Commonwealth providing recreation, sanitation, 
and water supply facilities to its member communities. The MDC was first organized as 
a water supplier in 1895. Act of June 5, 1895, ch. 488, 1895 Mass. Acts 565. 
2. The Connecticut River has its headwaters in the Connecticut Lakes of northern 
New Hampshire; the river drains portions of four states (New Hampshire, Vermont, 
Massachusetts, and Connecticut) and Canada. The Connecticut River basin has an area 
of 11,136 square miles, and the river is 280 miles in length. 
3. Presently, the MDC water district includes 34 communities within 15 miles of 
the State House in downtown Boston. Several central and western Massachusetts towns 
also receive MDC water. METROPOLITAN DISTRICT COMMISSION, METROPOLITAN 
WATER SYSTEM (1976) (pamphlet). 
4. See Act of Aug. 25,1970, ch. 766,1970 Mass. Acts 631. The power station is the 
Northfield Mountain plant operated by Northeast Utilities. The power plant and its op­
erating procedures are discussed more fully at notes 23-38 infra and accompanying text. 
See also Appendix A (diagram). 
As originally approved, the diversion could only be accomplished when the flow of 
the Connecticut River was greater than 15,000 cubic feet per second (cfs). Act of Oct. 13, 
1967, ch. 669, 1967 Mass. Acts 565. The figure presently authorized is 17,000 cfs, as 
measured at a United States Geological Survey monitoring station in Montague, Massa­
chusetts. Act of Aug. 25, 1970, ch. 767, 1970 Mass. Acts 631. See Appendix B (map) and 
notes 50-57 infra and accompanying text. 
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MDC's major collection and storage facility.s 
The Massachusetts legislature approved the Northfield diver­
sion in principle during the late 1960's6 when, in the aftermath of a 
sustained drought, the MDC's supply capability appeared to be im­
periled.7 At that time, there was little focused opposition to the 
Northfield diversion or to a companion diversion project involving a 
nearby Connecticut River tributary.s During the 1970's, however, 
substantial opposition emerged. Criticism of the plan came from 
sources as diverse as political leaders, environmental groups,9 and 
municipal and state governments. 10 The opposition succeeded in de­
laying the Northfield diversion and caused the Massachusetts legisla­
ture to modify its approval to the extent that the plan is now termed 
an alternative of last resort. I I 
Despite the delays and criticism, the MDC has continued to 
fund study of the plan and MDC officials remain confident that the 
Northfield diversion eventually will be authorized and funded by the 
5. The capacity of Quabbin Reservoir is 1,235,000 acre feet of water (an acre foot 
is the volume of water required to flood an acre to the depth of one foot and is equivalent 
to 325,851 gallons). METROPOLITAN DISTRICT COMMISSION, METROPOLITAN WATER 
SYSTEM (1976) (pamphlet). 
6. Act of Aug. 25, 1970, ch. 767, 1970 Mass. Acts 631; Act of Oct. 13, 1967, ch. 669, 
1967 Mass. Acts 565. 
7. In 1970, Quabbin was filled to only 57 percent of capacity. SPECIAL STUDY 
COMMISSION, REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY COMMISSION RELATIVE TO PROVIDING FUNDS 
FOR EXTENSION AND DEVELOPMENT OF WATER SUPPLY SOURCES AND DIVERSIONS 
FROM THE CONNECTICUT RIVER TO QUABBIN RESERVOIR, MASS. H.R. REP. No. 5543 
(1970) [hereinafter cited as SPECIAL STUDY COMMISSION, REPORT). 
8. The companion plan was to divert water from the Millers River in Erving, Mas­
sachusetts. M. DeFalco, A History of the Proposed Northfield Diversion Project 10 
(1979) (available at Connecticut River Watershed Council library, Easthampton, Massa­
chusetts). Although the plan has not been officially terminated, it has been given a low 
priority by the MDC because of the poor quality of the Millers River water and because 
the cost of accomplishing the diversion would be disproportionately high. 
9. E.g., the Co~ecticut River Watershed Council, Inc., and Massachusetts Public 
Interest Research Group (Mass PIRG). One citizen group, the Water Supply Citizens 
Advisory Committee, has undertaken a significant role in the drafting of the environ­
mental impact report on the diversion. 
10. The following communities, for example, have all passed resolutions expres­
sing opposition to the diversion, at least until all viable alternatives have been exhausted: 
Springfield, Massachusetts, Apr. 22, 1975; Northampton, Massachusetts, Dec. 18, 1975; 
Longmeadow, Massachusetts, Mar. 7, 1977; Hartford, Connecticut, Mar. 28, 1977; Mid­
dletown, Connecticut, Apr. 7, 1977 (copies of the resolutions are available at the Con­
necticut River Watershed Council library, Easthampton, Massachusetts). 
II. Statement by Evelyn Murphy, Massachusetts Secretary of Environmental Af­
fairs (Aug. 5, 1977) (available at Connecticut River Watershed Council library, East­
hampton, Massachusetts). See also MASS. J. REs., Resolutions on Major Water Supply 
Augmentation Projects (June 2, 1978). 
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legislature. 12 Should that authorization be forthcoming, the State of 
Connecticut likely will seek to enjoin the diversion. Connecticut's 
largest water district also is contemplating a major diversion of the 
Connecticut River to meet future supply requirements of greater 
Hartford. 13 Moreover, the Connecticut General Assembly has in­
structed the state attorney general to oppose any upstream diversions 
that might harm any interests of Connecticut or its citizens.14 
The Constitution grants the Supreme Court of the United States 
original jurisdiction over controversies between the states. IS During 
the twentieth century, the Court has apportioned water rights be­
tween states in six river basins. 16 Significantly, one suit brought 
before the Supreme Court was Connecticut v. Massachusetts,11 in 
which Connecticut sought an injunction to block construction of 
Quabbin and to prevent the MDC's diversion of a Connecticut River 
tributary. IS The Supreme Court denied relief on the ground that 
Connecticut had failed to prove the requisite injury to its interests, 
but the Court left open to Connecticut the right to bring suit again 
should its rights to jeopardized by future upstream diversions. 19 
This comment will explore, in the context of a potential suit to 
enjoin the Northfield diversion, the procedural, evidentiary, and le­
12. Holyoke Transcript-Telegram, Apr. 1, 1980, at 7, col. 1. Officially, the MDC 
also refers to the project as a last resort, but MDC administrators continue to regard the 
Northfield diversion as a high priority. 
13. Based on our water demand projections, our present water supply 
sources [surface reservoirs) will probably be fully utilized in about three de­
cades, following which the in-stream or ground-water aquifer flows of the Con­
necticut River or its tributaries will likely be the source of our future needs [sic). 
Both quality and quantity of flow will affect the District's beneficial utiliza­
tion of the Connecticut River. 
Statement by Gilbert Gustafson, Manager, Metropolitan District Commission of Hart­
ford (Jan. 10, 1972) (available at the Connecticut River Watershed Council library, East­
hampton, Massachusetts). 
14. 	 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 3-126 (1969). Section 3-126 provides in its entirety: 
The attorney general is authorized to investigate and, with the approval of 
the governor, to take such action as is deemed necessary to protect the state 
from damage by diversion or other interference with water from streams with­
out the state which enter or are tributary to streams flowing within the state. 
Any expenses incurred by the attorney general in instituting or maintaining 
proceedings incident to such action shall be paid from the treasury on the ap­
proval of the comptroller. 
Id; See also CONN. SEN. J. RES. No. 33 (Apr. 22, 1979); CONN. SEN. J. REs. No.4 (Apr. 
6, 1976). 
15. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
16. 	 See note 66 infra and accompanying text. 
17. 282 U.S. 660 (1931). 
18. 	 Id at 662. 
19. 	 Id at 674. 
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gal principles involved in adjudication of an interstate water dispute. 
Residents of southern New England will be directly affected by the 
outcome ofthe Northfield controversy. But the potential conflict be­
tween Connecticut and Massachusetts has broader implications as 
well. In the absence of congressional apportionment of an interstate 
stream,20 states with conflicting interests have only two avenues 
available through which to achieve a permanent resolution of their 
disagreement: Interstate compact21 and litigation. Both are burden­
some, time-consuming, and costly. 
Because natural resources, like the water of a flowing river, are 
of finite capacity, one state's exploitation of an interstate resource 
necessarily entails infringement upon the interests of another. In this 
context, interstate agreements may be impossible and litigation inev­
itable, at least when the infringement upon a state's interests is sub­
stantial. Connecticut and Massachusetts may resolve their 
differences over the Northfield diversion without resorting to litiga­
tion, but similar disputes will arise as potential sources of water are 
exhausted, while population and industrial growth increases de­
mand. For that reason, although the Supreme Court has not been 
active in apportioning water rights to interstate streams since 1945,22 
suits between competing states may become more frequent in the 
future. 
II. THE NORTHFIELD DIVERSION AND ITS POTENTIAL IMPACTS 
The origins of the Northfield diversion can be traced to the en­
gineering department of Northeast Utilities (NU), a holding com­
20. The waters of the lower Colorado·River basin were apportioned by the Boulder 
Canyon Project Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 617-617v (1976 and Supp. IV 1980). The Supreme 
Court sanctioned Congressional apportionment of the Colorado River in Arizona v. Cal­
ifornia, 373 U.S. 546 (1963). The Boulder Canyon legislation and Arizona v. California 
have been the subject of extensive discussion. See 2 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 134 
(R. Clark ed. 1967) [hereinafter cited as R. CLARK]' 
21. An agreement between two states is not permitted by the Constitution of the 
United States unless approved by Congress. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, c1. 1. The benefits 
of interstate water use compacts are explored in Muys, Interstale Compacts and Regional 
Water Resources Planning and Managemenl, 6 NAT. RES. LAW. 153 (1973); Stone, Inter­
slale Water Compacts, 24 ROCKY MTN. L. REv. 141 (1952). 
22. Since the Supreme Court decided Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589 (1945), 
there has been no judicial allocation of water rights between competing states. The 
Supreme Court, during the last 35 years, has entertained several suits involving other 
aspects of interstate water rights, and has amended several prior decrees. See, e.g., Ari­
zona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963). Cases decided prior to 1945 are discussed at 
notes 87-186 infra and accompanying text. 
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pany for several southern New England power companies.23 At the 
suggestion of top executives ofWestern Massachusetts Electric Com­
pany,24 an NU member utility, the engineers designing the North­
field Mountain hydroelectric power station (Northfield) in Erving, 
Massachusetts developed a site plan that would permit an economi­
cally feasible diversion of Connecticut River water into nearby 
Quabbin.25 Because of favorable public response26 and legislative 
action,27 NU incorporated the engineers' design for water diversion 
capability into the Northfield Mountain project.28 The Northfield 
power station was constructed and, in 1973, began generating 
electricity. 
Northfield operates by siphoning Connecticut River water into 
a tailrace and employing electrically driven pumps to direct that 
water through a tunnel to a mountaintop holding reservoir.29 The 
reservoir is approximately 800 feet above river level,30 so that when 
the system's operation is reversed, water returns through the tunnel 
23. N.U.'s member firms are The Connecticut Light and Power Company, The 
Hartford Electric Light Company, Western Massachusetts Electric Company, Holyoke 
Water Power Company, and Northeast Utilities Service Company. 
24. See CONNECTICUT RIVER WATERSHED COUNCIL, INC., QUABBIN FACTS 17 
(1967) [hereinafter cited as QUABBIN FACTS]. 
25. It can be argued that Northeast Utilities proposed the diversion as well as a 
series of public parks in the Northfield Mountain area less as a matter of largesse than as 
a political expedient, to enhance its bargaining posture as it sought licenses for construc­
tion and operation. 
26. A statement in a pamphlet printed by the Connecticut River Watershed Coun­
cil is perhaps indicative of much of the public response: 
Hailed by public officials and the press as the most dramatic water resource 
development in Massachusetts in recent years is the Northeast Utilities proposal 
to utilize the project's pumping facilities to provide 26 billion gallons annually 
of excess Connecticut River water to Quabbin Reservoir during the period of 
high freshet flow, primarily in the spring. 
QUABBIN FACTS, supra note 24, at 15-16. The Watershed Council now has an entirely 
new administration and has become a leading opponent of the diversion plan. See, e.g. , 
R. Hubley, Some Effects of the Proposed Diversion to Quabbin Through the Northfield 
Pump and Storage Facility (Apr. 30, 1977) (available at the Connecticut River Water­
shed Council library, Easthampton, Massachusetts). 
27. See Act of Oct. 13, 1967, ch. 669, 1967 Mass. Acts 565; MASS. J. RES., ch. 46, 
1967 Mass. Acts 888. 
28. N.U. constructed its reservoir with dikes four feet higher than necessary to im­
pound water for generating purposes, adding 375 million gallons of water storage capac­
ity, and included in the wall of the reservoir the necessary headworks for the Quabbin 
aqueduct. NORTHEAST UTILITIES, NORTHFIELD MOUNTAIN PuMPED STORAGE HYDRO­
ELECTRIC PROJECT AND RECREATION AREAS 20 (1967) [hereinafter cited as N.U., 
NORTHFIELD PAMPHLET]. 
29. See Appendix A (diagram). 
30. The elevation of the Connecticut River at Northfield Mountain is approxi­
mately 180 feet above sea level. The mountain top reservoir has a maximum elevation of 
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by force of gravity. The tunnel system directs the kinetic energy of 
the falling water over turbines at the foot of the mountain, thereby 
generating an average of one million kilowatts of electricity per 
hour.3! From the turbines, the falling water is directed back into the 
Connecticut River.32 
The philosophy of Northfield's operation is to systematically ex­
ploit fluctuations in wholesale electric rates, thereby minimizing 
NU's overall cost of meeting demand for electrical energy.33 When 
consumer demand is low, which is generally late at night, during 
weekends, and on holidays, the wholesale price of electricity de­
clines.34 During those periods, Northfield purchases the electricity 
necessary to pump water up to the storage reservoir.35 Conversely, 
when the wholesale price electricity commands is high, Northfield 
releases stored water and generates electricity.36 The system is inge­
nious, and permits NU to meet peak consumer demand with less 
frequent reliance on electricity purchased from other suppliers. Ad­
ditionally, any surplus energy generated at Northfield may be sold to 
other utilities at elevated peak demand prices. Northfield carries an­
other benefit: It generates electricity without the onsite use of nu­
clear or fossil fuels.37 Nonetheless, Northfield has a significant 
impact on the Connecticut River, for although the plant imposes no 
net loss on the river's flow, the periodic diversions and discharges of· 
water create an unnatural rhythm of ebb and flood in the Northfield 
reach of the river.38 
approximately 1,000 feet above sea level. N.U., NORTHFIELD PAMPHLET, supra note 28, 
at 5. 
31. Id at 6. 
32. Id 
33. Id at 2. 
34. Id 
35. Id Two nuclear-fueled power facilities, in Vernon, Vermont and Rowe, Mas­
sachusetts, are within twenty miles of the Northfield plant and provide a ready source of 
off-peak su!,ply. 
36. See id 
37. N.U. appropriately notes that the electricity to power the Northfield Mountain 
pumps comes from other steam and nuclear powered facilities. Id at 2. In effect, most 
of the environmental burdens of the Northfield operation are felt elsewhere in New 
England. 
38. L. Brower & P. Walford, Model Zeta: Potential Effects of Diverting Connecti­
cut River Flood Waters to Boston (Nov. 1979) [hereinafter cited as Brower & Walford, 
Model Zeta); P. Walford, The Yield of the Proposed Connecticut River Diversion (Sept. 
1980) [hereinafter cited as Walford, Yield Study) (both available at the Connecticut 
River Watershed Council library, Easthampton, Massachusetts). N.U. euphemistically 
refers to its "lower reservoir" as having a length of twenty miles and a surface area of 
2,000 acres. N.U., NOB.THAELD PAMPHLET, supra note 28, at 5. The "lower reservoir" is 
in fact the main stem of the Connecticut River between two major dams. The studies by 
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The MDC plan for diversion would utilize the existing pumping 
and storage capacities of Northfield through the simple expedient of 
connecting the mountaintop reservoir to Quabbin by aqueduct.39 
Because the elevation of Quabbin is 450 feet below the power station 
reservoir,40 and because the aqueduct would be less than ten miles in 
length,41 that segment of the diversion could be accomplished by 
force of gravity. The aqueduct would terminate at the head of the 
east branch of Quabbin.42 Connecticut River water would then min­
gle with Quabbin water, and join the gradual flow of the east branch 
toward the MDC intake at the southern end of the Quabbin.43 
Theoretically, the diversion would be limited only by the capac­
ity of the pumps at Northfield, which can divert water from the river 
at a staggering rate of 90,000 gallons per second.44 As a practical 
matter, however, the diversion would be limited by economic consid­
erations. Northfield could be expected to pump some additional 
water during periods oflow demand for electricity. Brief intervals of 
additional pumping would not create any substantial interference 
with the operation of the power station's generating cycle.45 But un-
Brower and Walford focus on the possible impacts of periodic ebb and flood on river 
ecology. Arguably, many of the impacts projected by the studies already occur as a by­
product of the power station's present pumping regimen; presumably Brower and 
Walford simply suggest those impacts would be exacerbated by a diversion. 
39. QUABBIN FACTS, supra note 24, at 16-17. As presently envisioned, the 
aqueduct would have an inside diameter of ten feet. DEP'T OF THE ARMY, ADDENDUM: 
NORTHFIELD MOUNTAIN WATER SUPPLY PROJECT NORTHEASTERN UNITED STATES 
WATER SUPPLY STUDY 6 (1974) (available from Corps of Engineers Regional Planning 
Office, Waltham, Massachusetts) [hereinafter cited as DEP'T OF THE ARMY, NORTHFIELD 
STUDY]. 
40. The maximum elevation of Quabbin Reservoir is 530 feet above mean low tide. 
QUABBIN FACTS, supra note 24, at 10. 
41. Estimates of the aqueduct's probable length vary from 8.5 to 9.8 miles. E. 
KAYNOR, CONNECTICUT RIVER DIVERSION: A CASE STUDY IN WATER ALLOCATION 
POLICY 46 (1978) [hereinafter cited as KAYNOR, WATER ALLOCATION STUDY]. 
42. QUABBIN FACTS, supra note 24, at 16. See Appendix B (map). There also has 
been some consideration given to building a longer aqueduct to the West Branch of 
Quabbin, thus insuring that the MDC intake would be more fully buffered from the 
lower quality Connecticut River water. 
43. At present, the MDC's plan for pretreatment and purification of the water in­
troduced into Quabbin is unclear. Williams, River Tapping: Would it Ruin our Drinking 
Water?, Boston Globe, June 8, 1980, (Magazine), at 7 [hereinafter cited as Williams, 
Boston Water]. 
44. N.U., NORTHFIELD PAMPHLET, supra note 28, at 5. The intake and discharge 
processes use the same tunnels; the only separate facilities are the pumps and turbines 
themselves. See Appendix A (diagram). 
45. Northfield station operates on a flexible schedule, with most pumping occuring 
during the night and on weekends. These periods would also be the times during which 
pumping to facilitate the MDC diversion would occur. In fact, actual release of water to 
the MDC could occur at any time that N.U. felt that water could be spared and the 
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less the MDC were willing to pay more for water than that water's 
value in power generation, no extra pumping would occur during 
any but these brief slack periods.46 NU proposed 375 million gallons 
per day (mgd) as a diversion volume acceptable to its interests.47 
That figure is based on the reservoir's excess storage capacity48 and is 
unrelated to the efficiency equation that would govern the daily di­
version volume from Northfield. For that reason, in the absence of 
legal limitations the figure could be readily modified by agreement 
between NU and the MDC.49 
Albeit through the use of very obscure language, the Massachu­
setts legislature's 1970 authorization for Northfield apparently 
adopted NU's suggested diversion volume of 375 mgd as a statutory 
limit.50 With a nod toward the interests of Connecticut River basin 
residents, the legislature also prohibited diversion "on any day when 
the flow of water in the Connecticut river ... in the town of Monta­
gue [several miles downstream of the power station] is less than sev­
enteen thousand cubic feet per second [17,000 CfS]."51 
storage reservoir had sufficient depth to permit release through the Quabbin aqueduct 
headworks in the reservoir wall. 
46. Presumably, in addition to the economic considerations that would limit diver­
sion volume to that which could be pumped in a relatively short period of time, an addi­
tional limitation would result from the technological requirements of time for 
maintenance and flow reversal procedures. Furthermore, discharge through the turbines 
can proceed at approximately 1.5 times the rate of pumping. N.V., NORTHFIELD PAM­
PHLET, supra note 28, at 5. As a result, most of the available nighttime and weekend 
hours are already used for the pumping necessary to maintain the sustained capacity to 
release water and generate electricity during the weekday hours of peak demand. 
47. Id at 20. 
48. Id At the rate of 90,000 gallons per second, approximately 1.2 hours is re­
quired to pump 375 million gallons. 
49. The mountain top reservoir is regularly filled to capacity once a week at the 
end of the sustained low-demand weekend period when pumping generally proceeds un­
interrupted. As has been noted, diversion from the reservoir is not effectively limited by 
the reservoir's capacity, the time of day, season of the year, or the rate of river flow. The 
only effective limit, short of the technological capacity of the pumping system, is eco­
nomic. See notes 33-37 supra and accompanying text. 
50. The Act states: "The amount of water diverted over a three consecutive year 
period shall not exceed three hundred and [sic) seventy-five million gallons per day for 
each day that the flow of the Connecticut river . . . exceeds seventeen thousand cubic 
feet per second." Act of Aug. 25, 1970, ch. 766, 1970 Mass. Acts 631. 
The language of the enactment may be fairly construed as authorizing diversion of 
titanic proportions of water on any given date, as long as the three year gallonage (per­
missible diversion days multiplied by 375 million gallons) is not exceeded. Professor 
Walford noted this possibility, but rejected it as inconsistent with the legislature's appar­
ent intent to maintain a reasonably stable stream flow in the Connecticut River. 
Walford, Yield Study, supra note 38, at 3. 
51. Act of Aug. 25, 1970, ch. 766, 1970 Mass. Acts 631. 
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Several interpretations of the 17,000 cfs limit are possible.52 The 
most logical construction is that no diversion would be permitted at 
any time when the preceding twenty-four hours' average river flow 
did not exceed 17,000 cfs. The average figure is appropriate because 
even during periods of peak spring flow, the Connecticut River is 
subject to large fluctuations in instantaneous flow, 53 caused by both 
natural forces and the effects of periodic storage and discharge from 
flood control and hydroelectric power facilities. 54 One study indi­
cates that diversions authorized on the basis of the 17,000 cfs-aver­
age calculation could occur on ninety-one days in a typical year.55 
Under that regimen, the Northfield diversion would theoretically en­
hance MDC supplies by an average of ninety-nine mgd,56 and would 
deplete the yearly flow of the river by thirty-four billion gallons. 
The MDC, from an unclear statistical basis, has projected seventy 
diversions per year, an average yield of seventy-two mgd, and a 
yearly river depletion of twenty-six billion gallons. 57 
External forces, especially regional weather patterns, suggest 
that no projection is absolutely reliable in predicting the actual func­
tion of the proposed diversion. As recently as the spring of 1980, 
Quabbin was filled to capacity and overflowing its spillway. 58 Pre­
dictably, the spring months are also when the Connecticut River 
peaks and its average flow most frequently exceeds 17,000 cfs at 
Montague.59 In many years, then, the Northfield diversion might 
52. See Walford, Yield Study, supra note 38, at 3-6. 
53. Instantaneous flow is the rate of stream flow at any given moment. Instantane­
ous flow can be monitored at any regular interval. The Montague gauge records flow 
bihourly. Brower & Walford, Model Zeta, supra note 38. 
54. Nearby hydropower facilities are the Turners Falls Dam, Vernon Dam (Ver­
mont), and the Northfield Mountain station. In his first study, Walford suggested that 
the appropriate construction of the Act, see note 50 supra, would be that diversion would 
only be permissible when flow exceeded 17,000 cfs at every monitoring interval during 
the preceding 24 hours. Walford, Yield Study, supra note 38, at 4. This interpretation 
seems unlikely given the history of the diversion proposal (the legislature had authorized 
diversion whenever the river flow exceeded 15,000 cfs) and the apparent intent of the 
legislature. Walford's strict construction would also have the probable effect of blocking 
diversion on any two consecutive days when the river was at any stage less than a raging 
flood, because the effect of one day's diversion could possibly cause a fluctuation below 
17,000 cfs at the downstream monitoring station. It seems unlikely th~e legislature in­
tended such a result. Walford subsequently adopted the average-flow interpretation in 
his second study. Brower & Walford, Model Zeta, supra note 38. 
55. Walford, Yield Study, supra note 38, at 5. 
56. The computation is: Permissible diversion days (91) multiplied by the prob­
able daily yield (375 mgd) divided by the number of days in a year (365). 
57. See KAYNOR, WATER ALLOCATION STUDY, supra note 41, at 58. 
58. Williams, Boston Water, supra note 43, at 7,11 (photograph). 
59. See Walford, Yield Study, supra note 38, at figure 2. During the past 75 years, 
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prove to be impractical during the season in which it could be ex­
pected to operate most safely and efficiently,60 simply because the 
MDC would not have storage capacity for additional supplies.61 
Conversely, during periods of drought, when the MDC's need 
would be greatest, the volume of river flow would be restricted and 
would less frequently exceed the 17,000 cfs flow requirement. Any 
diversions that might be accomplished during such periods of scar­
city would have more significant downstream impacts62 and would 
cause introduction of relatively poor quality water into the MDC 
system.63 
The vagueness of the enabling legislation, the inconsistent di­
version projections, and the imponderables of future demand and 
weather conditions make difficult an accurate projection of the 
Northfield diversion's impacts. Given the complexities involved, 
even the comprehensive Environmental Impact Report64 will be 
speculative in its projections. Apparently, some impacts would be 
substantial while others would be less so; any impact, of course, 
would vary in its harshness depending on the volume of diversion 
and the rate of river flow. For purposes of clarity, the likely impacts 
of diversion are presented in tabular form. Those impacts poten­
tially significant to interstate litigation will be discussed more fully in 
a subsequent section. 
the months of April and May have supplied over 50 percent of the days upon which 
diversion would be permissible under the present statutory formula. Id 
60. Spring Bood waters, per cubic foot, can be expected to carry lesser burdens of 
sewage and other organic contaminants than do waters Bowing at a more restrained vol­
ume and pace. Thus, water introduced into Quabbin would be purer during the spring. 
Similarly, a diversion of 375 mgd. were the river Bowing at 30,000 cfs, would likely have 
only a fraction of the downstream impact of a similar diversion accomplished were the 
river Bowing at 17,000 cfs. 
61. On the other hand, when the spring freshet follows a dry year, or if MDC 
member community demand increases substantially, Quabbin will not be full during the 
spring or any other season. 
62. See note 60 supra; see also TABLES I-III infra and accompanying notes. 
63. The amount of pollution discharged into the river is relatively constant 
throughout the year. Only Bow varies markedly; thus, during periods of low rate of flow, 
much higher concentrations of pollutants would be present in a given volume of water. 
If the quality of water in the Connecticut River were sufficiently poor, the MDC could be 
expected to forego an otherwise permissible diversion. 
64. The Environmental Impact Report will be the product of research by several 
consulting firms and a citizens advisory group. As of this writing, the report remains in 
its early stages of preparation. 
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TABLE I. Impacts Resulting From Restriction ofRiver Flow 
Impacted Populations 
Impact Effect and Activities 
Reduced flood Increase in riverbed Fisheriesb 





Increased salinity in Alteration of Riverbed musselse 
estuary estuarine habitat" Water supply 
Reduced inundation Alteration of Riverbed lifee 
of floodplain floodplain habitat/" Floodplain vegetation 
Agricultureh 
Reduced flow during Increase in river Fisheries 
an average of water temperature, Recreation 
ninety days per enhancing organic Waste disposal 
year contamination i Water supply 
Decrease in available Fisheries 
suspended oxygen, Recreation 
. enhancing organic Waste disposal 
contamination j ,Water supply 
Decrease in available Water supply 






a 	 Without strong flood currents to periodically flush the river and to scour the riverbed 
of accumulated sludge, sludge buildup will increase with the probable effect of 
reducing oxygen levels in the river and increasing water temperatures, thereby creat­
ing reverberations throughout the riverine food chain. See CONNECTICUT BASIN 
CO-ORDINATING COMM. COMPREHENSIVE WATER AND RELATED LAND RESOURCES 
INVESTIGATION, D-71 (1970) [hereinafter cited as BASIN COMM. COMPREHENSIVE 
INVESTIGATION]. 
b 	 "Fisheries" connotes impact on commercial fisheries. 
c 	 "Recreation" connotes impact on sport fishing, boating, swimming, and related 
shoreline activities. 
d 	 The primary effect of reduced flow on the Connecticut River estuary would be to 
move upstream the point at which river water is entirely fresh, and to cause, down­
stream of that point, an adjustment in the fresh to salt water gradient. At any given 
point below the furthest upstream influence of salt water, the river would be saltier 
than it would be were it not for the diversion. It is not clear whether the proposed 
Northfield diversion would have any perceptible effect on the estuary, which by the 
nature of tidal action, is a dynamic and changing zone under any circumstance. 
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e One study prepared for the Northfield Citizens Advisory Committee suggests a 
diversion might threaten an estuarine mussel, Alasmidonta heterodon. D. Smith, 
Report to Northfield Citizens Comm. (NCAC) (available at Connecticut River 
Watershed Council.library, Easthampton, Massachusetts). 
f 	 [P)ointbar and ox-bow lake formation, rejuvenation of coarse streambed 
breeding habitats, and the maintenance of the unique floodplain forests, 
swamps and marshes, depend on the extreme of flooding. Due to the very 
flat topography of the floodplain, a vertical change of very small magnitude 
in the level of flooding can make a much greater change in the area flooded. 
Even an inch (measured vertically), extended over the whole area of the 
floodplain, may reduce the area of inundation by hundreds of acres. 
R. Hubley, supra note 26. 
g 	 A slug, Cragonex pseudogracilis, whose breeding habitat is in floodplain backwaters, 
might be destroyed by any substantial alteration in annual floodplain inundation. D. 
Smith, supra note e. 
h The Connecticut valley has historically been an extremely fertile agricultural area, 

largely because of the alluvial deposits left by the Connecticut River. In recent years, 

valley agriculture has become largely dependent on the use of chemical fertilizers, 





Reduced flow increases the concentration of organic contaminants in any stream. In 

the absence of sufficient oxygen, organic compounds decay anaerobically, generating 

both heat and odor. See BASIN COMM., COMPREHENSIVE INVESTIGATION supra note 

a, at D-71. . 

j 	 As flow decreases and organic contaminants become more concentrated, available 
oxygen supplies are depleted, anaerobic decomposition occurs, and water quality 
decreases. fd. Decreased flow also lowers the turbulence of a stream, inhibiting its 
capacity to capture airborne oxygen. fd. 
k It has been suggested that the Northfield diversion, operating at the levels predicted 
by the MDC, would subtract only one percent of the Connecticut River's annual 
average flow. But it can be shown that reduced flow, reduced levels of oxygen, 
increased waste load, and increased anaerobic decomposition all are closely interre­
lated, and that disruption of the balance of these forces can substantially affect the 
quality of water in a stream. See notes a, i-j supra. 
TABLE II. Impacts Resulting From Cyclical Rapid Reductions 










Disruption of sensory 
orientation and 
spawning activity 
of sport and 








The discussion of ebb and flood impacts is based on the computer projections gener­
ated in the Model Zeta study, Brower & Walford, Model Zeta, supra note 38. 
m 	 Periodic rapid reductions in natural flow which "would occur during flood periods 
when the kinetic energy of the river is high, [might result in] erratic erosion patterns 
I 
1982] INTERSTATE WATER RIGHTS 	 653 

. particularly along the banks of the river." Id. Erosion and erratic patterns of 
flow would also probably increase the level of solids suspended in, and later precipi­
tating from, the waters of the Connecticut River. 
n 	 Brower and Walford also speculate that an unnatural ebb and flood cycle on an 
upstream reach of the river could seriously impair the direction-sensing processes of 
certain fish, most notably the shad and Atlantic salmon. fd. 
TABLE III. 	 Impacts Resulting From Introductions 0/ 
Connecticut River Water Into 
Quabbin Reservoir 
Impacted Populations 
Impact Effect and Activities 
Introduction of river Disruption of reser­ Recreation 
species into voir ecologyo Water supply 
Quabbin 
Introduction of Reduction in reser­ Water supply 
impure water in voir water qualityp 
Quabbin 
Increase in lake bed Water supply 
silting at mouth of 
aqueduct 




o 	 Quabbin Reservoir is renowned for excellent trout fishing. METROPOLITAN DIS­
TRICT COMMISSION, METROPOLITAN WATER SYSTEM (1976) (pamphlet). The sea 
lamprey, a parasitic eel-like fish, could enter Quabbin from its present habitat in the 
Connecticut River and rapidly throw the reservoir's carefully developed and delicate 
ecosystem into chaos by depleting the trout population. See Williams, Boston Water, 
supra note 43, at 7, 9. Another potential pest in the reservoir is the carp, which stirs 
up bottom sediments, causing turbidity and the destruction of fish eggs. T. CONVEL, 
QUABBIN: THE ACCIDENTAL WILDERNESS 57 (1981). 
P 	 Quabbin water is rated class A+, the highest purity classification. The Connecticut 
River is rated class C+, Williams, Boston Water, supra note 43, at 7, and carries high 
levels of organic contaminants from upstream sewage disposal and wood pulp 
processing. Water quality ratings in the New England states are based on a scale of 
class A to class D, class A being suitable for any use, class D being suitable only for 
navigation and some industrial uses. Ratings for the Connecticut River are based on 
an analysis of the following factors: level of dissolved oxygen, burden of sludge, 
color, turbidity, taste, odor, pH, coliform bacteria contamination, radioactivity, and 
levels of phosphates, ammonia, and phenols. BASIN COMM., COMPREHENSIVE 
INVESTIGATION, supra TABLE I, note a, at D-75 to 76. 
q 	 The Vermont Yankee power plant, nine miles north of the Northfield Mountain 
intake point, has had a checkered career as a nuclear facility. Its troubled history 
includes several incidents of radioactive discharge into the Connecticut River. Wil­
liams, Boston Water, supra note 43, at 9. Predictably, scientists and engineers have 
widely varying opinions concerning the risks of significant radioactive contamination 
of the MDC supply, but most concur that there is some danger. Id. 
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III. INTERSTATE WATER DIVERSION LITIGATION 

Under the constitutional grant of original jurisdiction,65 the 
Supreme Court has entertained six major lawsuits brought by down­
stream states requesting relief from upstream diversions.66 In four of 
those cases the Supreme Court issued decrees apportioning rights to 
water from interstate streams;67 in the others, the Court placed no 
restrictions on the challenged diversions.68 The cases are few and 
propound no firmly settled body of law that could be invoked to 
resolve an interstate suit joined over the Northfield diversion.69 The 
cases, however, do illustrate the broad principles of evidence and 
legal analysis that should govern future interstate water rights 
litigation. 
A recurrent theme in the cases is the problem of choice of law: 
Whether intrastate law, considerations of equity, or elements of both 
should govern the Supreme Court's decisions. Each of the fifty states 
has developed its own unique body of law apportioning rights to 
flowing water among competing users;70 thus, from the outset, the 
Court has rejected application of purely intrastate law.7l The Court, 
65. U.S. CONST., art. III, § 2, cl. I & 2. 
66. Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589 (1945) (apportioning the North Platte 
River); Washington v. Oregon, 297 U.S. 517 (1936) (declining to apportion the Walla 
Walla River); New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336 (1931) (apportioning the Delaware 
River); Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660 (1931) (apportioning the Connecticut 
River); Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419 (1922) (apportioning the Laramie River); 
Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907) (declining to apportion the Arkansas River). The 
Supreme Court has also decided one case brought by several Great Lakes states to pro­
test a diversion from Lake Michigan. See Wisconsin v. Illinois, 278 U.S. 367 (1929). 
Two other decisions considered diversions info interstate rivers. See North Dakota v. 
Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365 (1923); Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496 (1906). 
67. Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589 (1945); New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 
336 (1931); Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660 (1931); Wyoming v. Colorado, 
259 U.S. 419 (1922). 
68. Washington v. Oregon, 297 U.S. 517 (1936); Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 
(1907). 
69. The Supreme Court has recurrently used two shorthand phrases to characterize 
the principles it has applied: "[E]quality of right," Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 97 
(1907) and "equitable apportionment," Id at 118. See also Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 
U.S. 589,617 (1945); New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336, 343 (1931); Wyoming v. 
Colorado, 259 U.S. 419, 464 (1922). The principle of equitable apportionment is ex­
plored in 2 R. CLARK, supra note 20, § 132.1. 
70. See I R. CLARK, supra note 20, § 51. 
71. See Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125 (1902). The Court said, "[s]itting, as it 
were, as an international, as well as a domestic tribunal, we apply Federal law, state law, 
and intemationallaw, as the exigencies of the particular case may demand ...." Id at 
146-47. See also Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 98 (1907). "[T]hrough these succes­
sive disputes and decisions this court is practically building up what may not improperly 
be called interstate common law." Id 
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however, has accorded weight to general principles of water law 
shared by competing states.72 
The two major doctrines of water law are rip arianism, common 
to the eastern and Mississippi Valley states, and priority of appropri­
ation, common to the western states.73 Riparianism, a common law 
principle, historically gave downstream abutters rights to the undis­
turbed natural flow of a stream.74 Common law riparianism is now 
subject to numerous exceptions, including a rule common to most 
riparian states that upstream abutters are entitled to a reasonable use 
of a stream's flow for normal consumption and waste discharge.75 
But even under the modem doctrine of riparianism, rights to reason­
able use are limited to landowners abutting a body of water, so that 
distant consumers are restricted in their right to divert water from a 
stream.76 
In the western states, the doctrine of priority of appropriation 
developed as better suited to encouraging the large-scale irrigation 
and storage of spring runoff necessary for effective agricultural de­
velopment of arid land.77 By contrast to riparianism, priority of ap­
propriation attaches no significance to a user's proximity to a 
watercourse. Ownership of land abutting a stream carries no special 
rights of access to streamflow; a distant consumer is in theory enti­
tled to as much water as he can put to beneficial use.78 The gov­
erning rule of appropriation law is priority in time: During periods 
of water shortage, more recent (junior) appropriators must curtail, 
or, if necessary, cease their use of a stream so that prior (senior) ap­
propriators' demands can be satisfied.79 
The Supreme Court, in the interstate water diversion cases, has 
developed another principle of water rights to govern disputes be­
tween competing states: Equitable apportionment.8o Equitable ap­
portionment "is a label, not an analysis,"81 but functionally, it is a 
72. See notes 168-86 infra and accompanying text. 
73. For a more complete definition of the two doctrines see J. SAX, WATER LAW, 
PLANNING & POLICY 1-3 (1968). The importance of the doctrines in interstate water 
rights litigation is discussed in 2 R. CLARK, supra note 20, §§ 131.3 -.4. 
74. See 1 R. CLARK, supra note 21, §§ 17.1, 51.2. 
75. Reasonable use is discussed in 7 id, § 611. See a/so RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF TORTS §§ 850, 850A (1977). 
76. See, e.g., Stratton v. Mount Hermon Boys' School, 216 Mass. 83, 103 N.E. 87 
(1913). 
77. See 1 R. CLARK, supra note 20, § 18. 
78. See id,§§ 51.5 -.9. 
79. See id, § 51.9. 
80. See, e.g., Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 97-98 (1907). 
81. R. CLARK, supra note 20, § 132.1. 
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judgment based on "a consideration of the pertinent laws of the con­
tending States and all other relevant facts ...."82 Equitable appor­
tionment softens the harsh consequences of both riparian and 
appropriation doctrine, which, if applied to interstate disputes, 
. would have the effect of vesting absolute rights in certain states.83 
Approached chronologically, the Supreme Court decisions show 
a marked evolution in the Court's approach toward interstate water 
disputes and its willingness to rely on principles of intrastate water 
law. The early cases, couched in sweeping language, established the 
rule of equitable apportionment and alternately accepted or rejected 
state law principles in an inconsistent pattern.84 The later decisions 
gave fuller content to the term equitable· apportionment, and the 
Court engaged in a more sophisticated examination of the benefits 
and burdens resulting from large-scale diversions and of the expecta­
tions, born of state law, of the competing consumers.85 The Court 
drafted increasingly complex decrees of apportionment in an effort 
to fairly balance those considerations.86 The body of law that 
emerged may be settled in its general framework but, as a rule of 
equity, is adhoc in its application, wholly dependent upon the quali­
ty of the evidence adduced in any given controversy. 
Kansas was the first state to sue another over rights to the con­
sumption of the waters of an interstate stream. In 1901, Kansas 
brought suit against Colorado, alleging that Colorado was diverting 
an excessive volume of water from the Arkansas River.87 In Kansas 
v. Colorado,88 Chief Justice Fuller traced the Court's role in inter­
state dispute resolution and determined that water rights controver­
sies were a proper matter for the Court's original jurisdiction.89 A 
82. Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. at 670-71 (1931). 
83. If, for instance, a strict common law riparian rule were applied, an upstream 
state would be effectively foreclosed from any significant diversions ofwater unless water 
ofequal quantity and quality were returned to the stream. Similarly, as between compet­
ing appropriation states, strict application of appropriation law would give the state that 
first exploited a stream rights superior to a more recently developing state, without regard 
for equity or the regional implications of such an allocation. 
84. Compare Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907) with Wyoming v. Colorado, 
259 U.S. 419 (1922). . 
85. See, e.g., Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589 (1945). 
86. See, e.g., id at 665-72 (decree); New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 805 (1931). 
87. Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125, 132-39 (1902). 
88. 185 U.S. 125 (1902). 
89. Id at 139-47. Article III of the Constitution of the United States grants the 
federal judiciary jurisdiction over "[c]ontroversies between two or more states; ..." and 
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demurrer by Colorado was overruled.90 
After a lengthy period of factfinding by a Court appointed 
master,91 the merits of Kansas' claim were reached in 1907.92 In an 
opinion by Justice Brewer, the Supreme Court's jurisdiction was re­
confirmed, and the immense volume of evidence presented93 was 
condensed into several general findings: That the diversions prac­
ticed by Colorado irrigators had diminished the flow of the Arkansas 
River;94 that the Arkansas River region in Colorado was entirely de­
pendent on irrigation;95 that the Kansas counties bordering the river 
had recently lost population,96 and; that the crop yield in Kansas had 
not been clearly diminished because of upstream diversions.97 
Canvassing prior decisions on water rights, Justice Brewer con­
cluded that the Supreme Court's judgment was not bound by either 
state's internal rules of water law,98 but, rather, was governed by 
provides that the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction over cases to which a 
state is a party. U.S. CONST., art. III, § 2, cl. I & 2. The United States Judicial Code is 
more explicit, granting exclusive jurisdiction to the Supreme Court in "[a)ll controversies 
between two or more states ...." 28 U.S.C. § 1251 (1976). 
Since a demurrer was overruled in Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208 (1901), there 
has been no serious dispute about the propriety of litigating interstate water controversies 
before the Supreme Court. The principles of original jurisdiction are discussed in Note, 
The Original Jur.isdiction of tlte United Slates Supreme Court, II STAN. L. REv. 665 
(1959). 
90. Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. at 147. 
91. The Supreme Court has appointed a master in each of the interstate water 
rights cases. The master's responsibilities include collecting evidence, presiding over 
hearings, taking expert testimony, and reporting his or her findings to the Court. See 
FED. R. CIY. P. 53. 
92. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907). Kansas y. Colorado is discussed in 
Friedrich, The Settlement ofDisputes Between States Concerning Rights to tlte Waters of 
Interstate Streams, 32 IOWA L. REv. 244 (1947). 
93. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 105 (1907). Justice Brewer noted both the 
volume of evidence (8,559 pages, 122 exhibits, 347 witnesses) and its apparent unreliabil­
ity: "[T)here is no little contradiction and a good deal of confusion [in the evi­
dence)...." Id at 105-06. 
94. Id at 106-08, 117. 
95. Id at 109-10, 117. Justice Brewer observed that many of the Colorado diver­
sions had been undertaken over ten years before Kansas first brought suit. Id at 107-08. 
There was no suggestion in his opinion that the principle of laches should be invoked 
against the Kansas claim, although the Court was very solicitous of the needs of the 
Colorado irrigators who had become dependent on the diversions. "[The irrigators had) 
transform[ed) thousands of acres into fertile fields and render[ed) possible their occupa­
tion and cultivation where otherwise they would have continued barren and unoccu­
pied...." Id at 117. See note 127 infra. 
96. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. at 110, 112-13. 
97. Id at Ill, 113. 
98. Id at 98-105. Justice Brewer noted that Colorado was governed by the rule of 
prior appropriation while Kansas applied the eastern riparian rule. He neatly under­
mined Kansas' argument that the Court should apply strict riparian principles of unabat­
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rules of equity and a balancing of the interests of the competing 
states.99 Justice Brewer interpreted the evidence as demonstrating 
that while great benefits accrued to Colorado through irrigation, the 
diversions by which that irrigation was accomplished had worked 
only minimal injury on Kansas,loo and held that no relief should be 
granted. 101 Justice Brewer characterized the then existing division of 
Arkansas River waters as an "equitable apportionment of bene­
fits"I02 among the two states, despite some evidence that the riverbed 
in Kansas had been on occasion left dry.103 
Disputes between rival water users in the two states continued 
long after 1907, and in 1943, the Court again adjudicated the con­
flicting claims of Kansas and Colorado in Colorado v. Kansas .104 
The Court found that the flow of the Arkansas had actually in­
creased during the years intervening since its prior decision,105 and 
that while the State of Colorado and private Colorado users had in­
stituted sensible conservation procedures, Kansas users were using 
primitive techniques and making inefficient use of the flow of water 
available to them. 106 Again, no discernible injury to the interests of 
Kansas or its citizens had been proven. 107 Again, no substantive re­
strictions were placed on Colorado's use of the river. lOS 
ed flow by citing Clark v. Allaman, 71 Kan. 206, 80 P. 571 (1905), which had adopted a 
test of reasonableness in adjudicating riparian rights within Kansas. Kansas v. Colorado, 
206 U.S. at 102-03. 
99. See note 71 supra. 
100. Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. at 109-113, 1I7. 
101. Idatl17. 
102. Id at 1I8. Kansas was granted the right to again bring suit should the vol­
ume of diversions "material[lyJ increase." Id 
103. Id at lIS. 
104. 320 U.S. 383 (1943). Colorado had complained that a series oflawsuits filed 
by Kansas water users were disrupting Colorado's distribution planning, and that adjudi­
cation of the suits would result in a fixed interstate allocation system. Colorado argued 
such a result was in contravention of the Supreme Court's decision in Kansas v. Colo­
rado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907). Kansas in tum counterclaimed that Colorado had authorized 
diversions in excess of those approved by the earlier case. Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U.S. 
at 386-88 (1943). The 1943 decision is discussed in 44 COLUM. L. REV. 437 (1944). 
105. Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U.S. at 396-98 (1943). 
106. Id at 397. The principle of discouraging waste is central to water law, and 
could be a critical factor in any litigation over the proposed Northfield diversion. See 
notes 252-59 infra and accompanying text. 
107. Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U.S. at 400 (1943). 
108. Colorado v. Kansas, 322 U.S. 708 (1944) (decree). The individual Kansas 
water users were enjoined from further prosecuting their claims. Id The Court, possibly 
tiring of this conflict, had been blunt in advising states facing similar disputes in the 
future to attempt reaching agreement under the Compact Clause, rather than invoking 
the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Colorado v. Kansas, 320 U.S. at 392 (1943). 
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In 1922, the Supreme Court, in Wyoming v. Colorado, 109 entered 
its first decree I 10 apportioning the waters of an interstate river. Wyo­
ming brought suit to enjoin a Colorado irrigation project that would 
have removed a significant portion of the Laramie River's flow to 
irrigate lands outside the river's watershed.l ll Wyoming's first 
ground for objection, that no out of basin diversion from an inter­
state river should be permitted, was summarily dismissed as an in­
sufficient basis for the grant of an injunction. ll2 Similarly rejected 
was Colorado's contention that it should be permitted to consume all 
the river water regardless of any injury to the interests of a down­
stream state. 113 Noting that both states recognized the doctrine of 
priority of appropriation,114 Justice Van Devanter held that the prin­
ciple of priority, applied without regard for state lines, was the most 
equitable basis for apportioning the wat~rs of the Laramie River. I IS 
Justice Van Devanter then determined the dependable flow of the 
Laramie Riverl16 and ordered the priorities of the competing appro­
priators in both states.ll7 Because the volume of the appropriations 
recognized by both states exceeded the dependable flOW,118 the 
Court's decree enjoined Colorado from permitting a planned diver­
sion by the most junior appropriator in that state from exceeding a 
fixed annual volume.l l9 
The decree proved ineffective in circumscribing the conduct of 
Colorado and its appropriators, and Wyoming continued to press its 
c1aims.l20 In 1936, the Court held that certain appropriations in Col­
109. 259 u.s. 419 (1922). Wyoming v. Colorado is discussed in Bannister, Interstate 
Rights in Interstate Streams in the Aritl West, 36 HARV. L. REv. 960 (1923). 
110. 259 U.S. at 496 (1922) (decree). 
111. Id at 456. 
112. Id at 466-67. The Court's opinion noted that similar diversions were permit­
ted under the laws of both states. Id 
113. Id at 466. Such a rule would be totally alien to the rules of equitable appor­
tionment laid down in Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907), and in several other 
Supreme Court decisions. Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. at 466. 
114. Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. at 467, 470-71. See notes 73-76 supra and 
accompanying text. 
liS. Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. at 470. 
116. Id at 471-89. 
117. Id at 489-95. 
118. Id at 489. 
119. Id at 496. The decree was modified shortly thereafter. Wyoming v. Colo­
rado, 260 U.S. I (1922). The limits placed by the decree on the most junior appropriator 
is entirely consistent with the rules of prior appropriation. See notes 73-79 supra and 
accompanying text. 
120. The individual appropriators were explicitly held bound by an interim decree, 
Wyoming v. Colorado, 286 U.S. 494 (1932). 
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orado should be terminated. 121 Otherwise, Colorado was free to 
vary the volume of diversions allocated to individual appropria­
tors,122 as long as the aggregate limits imposed by the earlier decree 
were observed.123 Evidently, despite its references to individual ap­
propriators, the prior decision had not been intended to fix the rights 
of the individual appropriators, but only to establish their priorities 
as a tool in fairly apportioning the Laramie River among the com­
peting states. 124 Rules of priority, on the facts of Wyoming v. Colo­
rado,12S simply had provided a convenient formula to apply in 
attaining that goal. 126 
The Supreme Court in 1931 first addressed the problems of ap­
portioning water rights to interstate rivers among contending ripa­
rian states. 127 In ConnectiCut v. Massachusetts l28 and New Jersey v. 
121. Wyoming v. Colorado, 298 U.S. 573, 579, 581-82, 586 (1936). Justice Van 
Devanter found that Colorado had excusably violated several unclear provisions of the 
earlier decree, and because Colorado had promised to abide by any clarification of its 
rights, no injunction was issued to correct those violations. Id at 579. Another diversion 
that had be.en carried on beyond the limitations placed by the decree, with "distinctly 
wasteful" results, was placed under a specific injunction. Id at 581-82, 586. This second 
major opinion in the Laramie River controversy is discussed in Simsarian, The Diversion 
ofInlerslale Walers in Ihe Uniled Slales, 32 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 907 (1938). 
122. The appropriators were those recognized in the 1922 decision. See note 119 
supra and accompanying text. 
123. Wyoming v. Colorado, 298 U.S. 573, 584-85 (1936). 
124. Id at 583-85. Justice Van Devanter found that the rights of individual appro­
priators were governed by state law and not properly before the Court: 
It was not the purpose of that suit or of the decree to withdraw water clainIs 
dealt with therein from the operation of local laws relating to their transfer or to 
restrict their utilization in ways not affecting the rights of one state and her 
claimants as against the other state and her claimants. 
Id at 584. 
125. 259 U.S. 419 (1922). 
126. Justice Van Devanter's opinion noted that appropriation law, in addition to 
providing a fair basis for the decision, placed mutual responsibilities on both states to 
make fair and reasonable use of the Laramie River. Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. at 
484. The 1936 decision was further clarified in Wyoming v. Colorado, 309 U.S. 572 
(1940) and amended by consent of both states in Wyoming v. Colorado, 353 U.S. 953 
(1957). 
127. In 1929, the Supreme Court had adjudicated another major water dispute in 
Wisconsin v.lllinois, 278 U.S. 367 (1929), which focused on the rights ofstates bordering 
on the Great Lakes. Wisconsin, together with Michigan, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and New 
York, had brought suit to have the Court enjoin the novel waste disposal practices of 
Chicago, hinging on the diversion ofhuge volumes ofwater from Lake Michigan into the 
Mississippi River system. By the early 1920's that diversion had caused the level of the 
lower Great Lakes to decrease by six inches. The states opposing the diversion succeeded 
in obtaining a decree which imposed major, step-by-step reductions in the volume of 
water Chicago was permitted to siphon from Lake Michigan. Id at 420. Wisconsin v. 
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New York,129 the Court permitted major diversions from tributaries 
of the Connecticut and Delaware Rivers. 
Connecticut v. Massachusetts 130 grew out of the expanding water 
supply requirements of Boston and, as would any litigation over the 
proposed Northfield diversion, pitted the interests of the Connecticut 
Valley against those of eastern Massachusetts. As the Boston metro­
politan area grew in the early twentieth century, water demand rap­
idly overtaxed the supply available from the MDC's existing 
sources. l3l By 1927, the Massachusetts General Court had settled on 
the construction of Quabbin to relieve the supply crisis, and the nec­
essary legislation was enacted.132 In 1928, Connecticut filed suit, al­
leging that the Quabbin plan would violate Connecticut's riparian 
rights in the Connecticut River in several respects. 133 Connecticut 
sought an injunction forbidding the impoundment of the Swift River 
and diversions to Quabbin from the Ware River}34 Both rivers are 
tributaries of the Connecticut. 
After a period of factfinding, the Supreme Court ruled on the 
merits of Connecticut's claim, denying requests for injunctions 
against both the Quabbin plan and any future diversions. 13S Con­
necticut had attempted to prove injury to its shad fishery, hydroelec-
Illinois has substantial importance in the related field of interstate river rights litigation, 
for the case demonstrates the significance the Court may attach to objectively proven 
harm. The Supreme Court was clearly impressed by the substantial long term damage to 
Great Lakes shipping interests. Id at 408-09. Collecting such evidence, which is the 
product of observing the effect of an accomplished diversion, is not without its draw­
backs. As was noted in Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907), the Supreme Court 
showed great solicitude for the reliance a region may come to place on an accomplished 
diversion. See note 95 supra and accompanying text. 
128. 282 U.S. 660 (1931). Connecticut v. Massachusetts is discussed in Kelly, Ra­
tioning the Rivers: A Decade ofInterstate Waters and Interstate Commerce in the Supreme 
Court, 14 ROCKY MT. L. REv. 12 (1941); Burch, Conflicling Inlerests ofSlales over Inter­
slale Walers, 10 TENN. L. REv. 267 (1932). 
129. 283 U.S. 336 (1931). New Jersey v. New York is discussed in Simsarian, The 
Diversion of Interslale Waters in the Uniled Slates, 32 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 907 (1938); 
Burch, Conflicting Interests ofStates over Inlerstate Waters, 10 TENN. L. REv. 267 (1932) 
(Judge Burch was the Master who had collected evidence and made recommendations to 
the Supreme Court in New Jersey v. New York). 
130. 282 U.S. 660 (1931). 
131. Id at 664-65. 
132. See Act of April 26, 1927, ch. 321, 1927 Mass. Acts 384; Act of May 28,1926, 
ch. 375,1926 Mass. Acts 441. As constructed, Quabbin Reservoir flooded approximately 
39 square miles of the Swift River basin and wiped out four Massachusetts towns: Pres­
cott, Dana, Enfield, and Greenwich. Approximately 2,500 people were resettled. QUAB­
BIN FACTS, supra note 24, at 3, 10-11. 
133. 282 U.S. at 662-63. 
134. Id at 662, 665-66. 
135. Id at 673-74. 
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tric power facilities, floodplains, and to the navigability of the 
river.136 Connecticut also argued a classical riparian right to an una­
bated flow of the river.137 Justice Butler found the evidence 
presented unpersuasive,138 and held that earlier cases compelled a 
complaining state to prove that "the threatened invasion of rights is 
of serious magnitude and established by clear and convincing evi­
dence,"139 a burden he found Connecticut had not met. 140 Similarly, 
Justice Butler rejected any suggestion that an out-of-basin diversion 
was inherently objectionable,141 as it would be under pure riparian­
ism.142 Justice Butler refused to allow other elements of riparianism 
to govern the Supreme Court's reasoning. 143 Rather, he held that 
given Boston's need for a dependable source of drinking water, the 
absence of any proven alternative sources, and the inadequacy of 
Connecticut's proof of injury, no injunction should be issued. 144 Sig­
nificantly, however, the Court's final decree l45 placed an affirmative 
obligation on Massachusetts to abide by limits placed on the opera­
tion of Quabbin,146 and granted Connecticut the right to renew its 
objections if its "substantial interests" were threatened by violation 
of those limits through a "material increase" 147 in the Massachusetts 
diversions from the Ware and Swift Rivers. 148 
136. Id. at 666-67. 
137. Id. at 669-70. 
138. Id. at 666-67, 672-73. 
139. Id. at 669. Justice Butler cited New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. at 309 and 
Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496, 521 (1906). Both those cases pertained to claims of 
nuisance arising from the sewage disposal practices of the defendant states, rather than 
the disruption of an interstate river's flow caused by a diversion. Justice Holmes had 
defended the imposition of these burdens in interstate litigation in Missouri v. Illinois, 
200 U.~. 496, 519-11 (1906). 
140. 282 U.S. at 669. 
141. Id. at 672. 
142. See note 76 supra and accompanying text. 
143. 282 U.S. at 670-72. See notes 73-76 supra and accompanying text. 
144. 282 U.S. at 672-74. Justice Butler said, "Drinking and other domestic pur­
poses are the highest uses of water." Id. at 673. 
145. Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 283 U.S. 789 (1931) (decree). 
146. The limits were incorporated from Massachusetts legislation and an agree­
ment between Massachusetts and the Army Corps of Engineers. See Connecticut v. 
Massachusetts, 282 U.S. at 665, 672, 674. 
147. Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 283 U.S. 789, 790 (1931). 
148. Neither the Swift nor Ware Rivers enter Connecticut before discharging into 
the main stem of the Connecticut River, thus Connecticut has never had any legally 
cognizable interest in the flow of either river except as each contributes to the flow of the 
main stem. In Wyoming v. Colorado, 298 U.S. 573 (1936), the Supreme Court made 
clear that it did not intend that its decree be read as circumscribing the internal w&ter 
allocation rules of the party states. See note 126 supra. Thus, the decree in Connecticut 
v. Massachusetts, 283 U.S. 789 (1931), which limited the diversion volume from two in­
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A resolution similar to that in Connecticut v. Massachusetts 149 
was reached by Justice Holmes in New Jersey v. New York. lso New 
Jersey alleged that a New York plan to impound and divert to New 
York City the waters of several Delaware River tributaries would 
violate New Jersey's general riparian rights and cause certain spe­
cific injuries. lsl In line with the rule stated in Connecticut v. Massa­
chusetts,IS2 Justice Holmes rejected application of strict riparianism, 
stating: 
[A] more liberal answer may be given [in resolving interstate 
disputes] than in a controversy between neighbors members of a 
single State. Different considerations come in when we are deal­
ing with independent sovereigns having to regard the welfare of 
the whole population and when the alternative to settlement is 
war. In a less[er] degree, perhaps, the same is true of the quasi­
sovereignties bound together in the Union. A river is more than an 
amenity, it is a treasure. It ojJers a necessity of life that must be 
rationed among those who have power over it. . . . Both States 
have real and substantial interests in the River that must be recon­
ciled as best they may be. The different traditions and practices in 
different parts of the country may lead to varying results, but the 
effort is always to secure an equitable apportionment without qUib­
bling over formulas [SiC].IS3 
Although Justice Holmes cited no evidence to support such a 
conclusion, New Jersey's allegations that the diversion would impair 
recreation and oystering in the river were deemed proven. IS4 The 
decreelss therefore placed a ceiling, well below that requested by 
Iraslate rivers, may be read as a limit on Massachusetts' right to divert from the main 
stem or any tributary, if the combined effect of that and the existing Quabbin diversion 
would cause an injury to Connecticut's interests. The Court implicitly made this sugges­
tion, holding that a prospective injunction was unnecessary because "Massachuset~ de­
clares that she intends to and must obey these findings of the War Department. Her 
statements. . . clearly negative any threat, intention or purpose to make any diversion of 
water in excess of that spec!fted . ... " Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. at 674 
(emphasis added). 
149. 282 U.S. 660 (1931). 
150. 283 U.S. 336 (1931). 
151. Id at 338-39, 343-45. The injuries alleged were to fisheries, water quality, 
industry, property values, water supply, agriculture, and recreation. Id Pennsylvania 
had intervened, not in direct opposition to the New York plan, but to request that the 
diversion be charged against New York's equitable share of the Delaware River's dow. 
Id at 340-41. 
152. 282 U.S. 660 (1931). 
153. 283 U.S. at 342-43 (emphasis added). 
154. Id at 345. 
155. New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 805 (1931) (decree). 
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New York, on the volume of permissible diversions. 156 Although the 
master found that the diversion did not seriously threaten the water 
quality in the main stem of the Delaware River,157 the decree also 
obligated New York, before it could effect the diversion, to construct 
a sewage treatment plant to purify wastes entering the river at Port 
Jervis, New York.15s In line with the decree entered in Connecticut v. 
Massachusells,159 New York also was required to release a limited 
volume of the impounded waters during periods of low flow in the 
main stem. 160 
Washington v. Oregon,161 decided in 1936, was perhaps the most 
easily resolved of the interstate water diversion cases. Washington 
alleged that Oregon irrigators were appropriating an excessive vol­
ume of water from a branch of the Walla Walla River and requested 
a decree of equitable apportionment. 162 Based largely on the 
master's findings, Justice Cardozo dismissed the claim on several 
grounds. 163 
Justice Cardozo found elements of laches in the conduct of 
Washington and of the key Washington consumer, Gardena Farms, 
who had permitted the Oregon diversions to go unchallenged for al­
most fifty years. 164 He also found that the Washington appropriator 
156. The limit, 440 mgd, was considerably less than New York's planned diversion 
volume of 600 mgd. New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. at 339-40. 
157. Id at 345. 
158. Id at 346. 
159. 282 U.S. 660 (1931). 
160. 283 U.S. at 346-47. The decree was made subject to the paramount interest of 
the United States in protecting the navigability of the Delaware River. Id at 348. The 
decree was modified in 1954, with the consent of Delaware, Pennsylvania, and New 
Jersey, to permit New York to increase the volume of its diversions on completion of a 
new dam. New Jersey v. New York, 347 U.S. 995 (1954). The use of the Delaware River 
as a water supply is now governed by the Delaware River Basin Compact, Pub. L. No. 
87-328,75 Stat. 688 (1961). 
161. 297 U.S. 517 (1936). Washinglon v. Oregon is discussed in Kelly, Ralioning Ihe 
Rivers: A Decade o/Inlerslale Walers and Inlerslale Commerce in Ihe Supreme Court, 14 
ROCKY MT. L. REV. 12 (1941). 
162. 297 U.S. at 518-19. The Walla Walla actually divides into several branches in 
northeastern Oregon. Oregon farmers had been in the practice of diverting most of the 
water from the largest branch into the smaller ones, from which irrigation channels had 
been dug. Id at 519-22. Washington also had alleged that the Oregon farmers were 
improperly taking and applying the region's groundwater. Those allegations were re­
jected on several grounds. Id at 524-26. 
163. Id at 530. 
164. Id at 529-30. Justice Cardozo offered a stinging rebuke to Washington in the 
course of his opinion. 
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undertook its irrigation project knowing of the preexisting Oregon 
diversions165 and had failed to complete its project diligently.166 
Based on those findings, relevant to both considerations of equity 
and of appropriation law, Justice Cardozo held that the Oregon irri­
gators were not taking more than their rightful share of the Walla 
Walla River's flOW. 167 
In 1945, Nebraska v. Wyoming,168 the most recent and most 
complex interstate diversion case was decided. Justice Douglas, 
writing for five members of the Court,169 adjudicated the rights of 
three competing states to the waters of the North Platte River. The 
North Platte originates in Colorado and flows through Wyoming 
and Nebraska before entering the Missouri River. The North Platte 
had long been subject to extensive diversions for the purpose of irri-
The case comes down to this: the court is asked upon uncertain evidence 
of prior right and still more uncertain evidence of damage to destroy possessory 
interests enjoyed without challenge for over half a century. In such circum­
stances an injunction would not issue if the contest were between private par­
ties, at odds about a boundary. Still less will it issue here in a contest between 
states, a contest to be dealt with in the large and ample way that alone becomes 
the dignity of the litigants concerned. 
Id at 529. 
165. Id at 527. 
166. Id at 528-29. 
167. Id at 526-27. 1ustice Cardozo gave great weight to the principles of priority 
of appropriation in his decision. That same concept was central to the decision in Wyo­
ming v. Colorado, though in both cases the Court emphasized that considerations of eq­
uity dictated a similar result. See notes 114-15 supra and accompanying text. 
Washington v. Oregon was also grounded on a very practical finding. Because of the 
porous qualities of the Walla Walla riverbed, even were the Oregon diversions to be 
enjoined, little or none of the water flowing past the site of those diversions would reach 
Washington during the dry season. 1 ustice Cardozo observed: 
To restrain the diversion ... would bring distress and even ruin to a long es­
tablished settlement of tillers of the soil for no other or better purpose than to 
vindicate a barren right. This is not the high equity that moves the conscience 
of the court in giving judgment between the states. 
Washington v. Oregon, 297 U.S. at 523 (citations omitted). 
168. 325 U.S. 589 (1945). See Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546 (1963) in which 
the Court confirmed the paramount authority of Congress to allocate the water of a navi­
gable interstate river (the Colorado) under its Article I power to regulate interstate com­
merce. Although the Arizona v. CalifOrnia Court considered the proper allocation of 
water from certain Colorado River tributaries, its decision was based on statutory con­
struction, not principles of equitable apportionment: 
169. 1ustice 1ackson took no part in the decision. 1ustice Roberts, joined by 1us­
tices Rutledge and Frankfurter, dissented on the grounds that the case was not properly 
justiciable, as Nebraska had not carried its burden ofproof. 325 U.S. at 657-64 (Roberts, 
1., dissenting). 
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gating arid lands and was impounded behind a series of dams in 
Wyoming and Nebraska to maximize a reliable water supply.170 
The controversy arose in part because of the construction of another 
dam in Wyoming, the Kendrick Project,171 and in part because of 
the effects of a series of droughts beginning in 1930 and persisting for 
some thirteen years. 172 Nebraska alleged that the new dam 
threatened the future water supply to western Nebraska, and that the 
drought, in concert with upstream diversions, had caused an insuf­
ficient flow of water to even satisfy Nebraska's then existing needs. 173 
Justice Douglas, adopted the master's findings, and by denying 
Colorado's motion to dismiss, held that the North Platte River had 
been over-appropriated by Colorado and Wyoming and that a justi­
ciable controversy existed. 174 Justice Douglas applied the locally 
adopted principles of priority of appropriation as a general guide, 
but stated: 
[I]f an allocation between appropriation States is to be just 
and equitable, strict adherence to the priority rule may not be pos­
sible. For example, the economy of a region may have been estab­
lished on the basis of junior appropriations. So far as possible 
those established uses should be protected though strict applica­
tion of the priority rule might jeopardize them. Apportionment 
callsfor the exercise ofan informed judgment on a consideration of 
manyfactors .175 
Justice Douglas divided the river into six segments. 176 Based on 
170. Id at 594-97. 
171. The dam was constructed by the federal government, and had not been put 
into operation before Nebraska v. Wyoming was decided. Id at 597. 
172. Id at 598-99. 
173. Id at 599. 
174. Id at 608-11. Justice Douglas found that all three states were governed by 
appropriation law, although eastern sections of Nebraska follow principles of riparian­
ism. Id at 599-600. 
175. Id at 618. (emphasis added). Justice Douglas continued: 
Priority of appropriation is the guiding principle. But physical and cliinatic 
conditions, the consumptive use of water in the several sections of the river, the 
character and rate of return flows, the extent of established uses, the availability 
of storage water, the practical effect of wasteful uses on downstream areas, the 
damage to upstream areas as compared to the benefits to downstream areas if a 
limitation is imposed on the former-these are all re!evant factors. They are 
merely an illustrative, not an exhaustive catalogue. They indicate the nature of 
the problem of apportionment and the delicate adjustment of interests which 
must be made. 
Id 
176. Id at 593. One segment was in Colorado, three in Wyoming, and two in 
Nebraska. The two Nebraska segments were essentially ignored because the critical 
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a balancing of priority rights, practical considerations, and equities, 
appropriators in four of the segments were granted rights to ~ share 
of the dependable flow of the river.177 Domestic uses in all three 
states were exempted from any of these limitations.l78 Rights to the 
water in the most fiercely contested segment of the river were allo­
cated between Wyoming and Nebraska on a percentage formula de­
rived from appropriation volumes during periods of high river 
flow.l79 Such a determination was alien to the actual priorities that 
were recognized in that region 180 but was seen by Justice Douglas as 
the most sensible and equitable basis for allocating rights, particu­
larly during periods of drought when reliance on the river would be 
at its height.181 
Justice Douglas' opinion drew substantially upon the soundest 
elements of the Court's analysis of prior interstate water diversion 
controversies. The decision in Nebraska v. Wyomingl82 accorded 
considerable weight to state law governing water rights to the source 
in dispute, but state law clearly was made secondary to the principles 
of equitable apportionment. 183 
Equitable apportionment was explicitly recognized as the prod­
uct of a balancing of three factors beyond the consideration of rights 
vested under state law. One of the factors was the practical consider­
ation of avoiding regulation of an upstream use when that regulation 
would create no downstream benefits. 184 A second factor was the 
consideration, common to equity, of the reliance interests of those 
who had become dependent on established diversions. 18s A third 
factor accorded substantial weight was the character of various uses; 
reach of the North Platte was the easternmost segment in Wyoming. It was from that 
segment that virtually all of the Nebraska appropriators who depended on the North 
Platte drew their water. Id at 595-96, 654-55. 
177. Id at 621-55. Colorado users were, for instance, limited to their present levels 
of consumption. Id at 621-23. See note 176 supra for treatment accorded the two most 
downstream segments. 
178. 325 U.S. at 656. 
179. Id at 637-43. 
180. Id at 641 (table listing priorities). 
181. Id at 643. There were also considerations of efficiency and economic fairness 
supporting this determination. Id at 640. 
182. 325 U.S. 589 (1945). 
183. Id at 618, 646. This holding, together with Justice Douglas' interpretation of 
Washington v. Oregon and Wyoming v. Colorado, brought the western appropriation 
cases more in line with the decisions in New Jersey v. New York and Connecticut v. Mas­
sachusetts, which had rejected application of strict riparian principles. 
184. 325 U.S. at 619. 
185. Id at 618, 621, 643. 
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whether wasteful or efficient, whether domestic or agricultural. 186 
Clearly, Justice Douglas intended that all the relevant burdens cre­
ated by a diversion from an interstate stream be considered and 
weighed against a similar consideration of the diversion's benefits. 
That analysis should apply to future litigation as well. Those factors 
explored by Justice Douglas, as well as several other contemporary 
factors, would be central to the development of evidence and argu­
ments to be presented should Connecticut seek an injunction to bar 
the proposed diversion at Northfield. 




The rule established in the interstate water diversion cases is 
that a state opposing diversion of water must allege substantial in­
jury to sustain a suit187 and must prove that injury by clear and con­
vincing evidence in order to obtain an injunction.188 Further, a state 
bringing suit must confront two unattractive options in the timing of 
its objections. A state may seek an injunction before a diversion is 
accomplished, shouldering the burden of demonstrating injury based 
only on projections of impact. 189 Alternatively, it may allow the di­
version to occur and collect hard evidence of impact, then shoulder­
ing the burden of opposing an established use. l90 
The Supreme Court has embraced several principles that may 
mitigate a complaining state's burdens in certain factual settings. 
The Court has considered the totality of downstream impacts im­
posed by a diversion: Thus, where no single injury was of sufficient 
magnitude, several lesser injuries, when considered together, were 
found substantial enough to justify at least a partial injunction. 191 
Similarly, a state has not been permitted to accomplish through a 
series of minor diversions, each with minimal impacts, that which 
would not have been permissible to accomplish through a single, 
major diversion. 192 
The Supreme Court also has accorded weight to the nature of 
186. Id. at 618, 656. 
187. See, e.g., Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. at 669. 
188. Id. at 669. 
189. See, e.g., Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660 (1931). 
190. See, e.g., Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907); see also note 127 supra. 
191. See, e.g., New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. at 345; see notes 154-58 supra 
and accompanying text. 
192. While this rule has never been explicitly stated, it is implicit in several of the 
interstate water diversion cases, in which the cumulative downstream impact of all of a 
state's diversions were considered. See, e.g., New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336 
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water use in the contending states, thereby establishing a rough hier­
archy of values for differing uses. 193 Consumptive use has been val­
ued over nonconsumptive. l94 Domestic consumption has been 
valued over agricultural consumption. 195 Efficient use has been val­
ued over inefficient use. 196 Thus, should a downstream state success­
fully demonstrate its use would be more valuable than the diverting 
state's use, the downstream state's chances ofobtaining an injunction 
would be greatly enhanced.l97 By the same logic, ifa diversion were 
wasteful, or were effected to supplement a wasteful use, there would 
be a good possibility that the diversion would be enjoined. 
Finally, the Court has applied the principles of use hierarchy 
and the consideration of overall downstream impact in a more gen­
eralized balancing of the burdens and benefits occasioned by a water 
diversion.l98 In Connecticut v. Massachusetts,199 for example, in ad~ 
dition to surveying all the injuries Connecticut alleged, Justice Butler 
examined Boston's need for drinking water, the paramount value of 
that use, and the lack of viable alternatives to the proposed construc­
tion of Quabbin.2°O Justice Butler's decision favorable to Massachu­
setts was premised not merely on Connecticut's failure to prove 
substantial injury: Consistent with the general concept of equitable 
allocation, his implicit finding was that the benefits of the diversion 
outweighed its burdens.201 
As has been shown, however, in controversies in which the bal­
ance of burdens and benefits has been reversed, diversions have been 
enjoined.202 Should the Northfield diversion plan near fruition, and 
(1931) (considering the overall impacts of several planned diversions by the State of New 
York). 
193. See, e.g., Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. at 673; see notes 144, 178, 
186 supra and accompanying text. . 
194. See, e.g., Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907); see notes 102-05 supra and 
accompanying text. 
195. See, e.g., Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589 (1945); see note 174 supra and 
accompanying text. 
196. See, e.g., Colorado v. Kansas, 281 U.S. 179 (1930); see notes 107-10 supra and 
accompanying text. 
197. This rule is implicit in Wisconsin v. Dlinois, 248 U.S. 367 (1929); see note 127 
supra. On the other hand, where similar uses ofwater are made in the contending states, 
the Court has not required that each use be equally productive. Wyoming v. Colorado, 
259 U.S. at 468-69. 
198. See notes 94-97, 144, 154-60, 175 supra and accompanying text. 
199. 282 U.S. 660 (1931). 
200. See note 144 supra and accompanying text. 
201. Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. at 673. 
202. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Dlinois, 281 U.S. 179 (1930); see note 127 supra; see 
also Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589 (1945); note 177 supra. 
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should Connecticut seek to enjoin the diversion, the principles of 
overall downstream impact, hierarchy of uses, and burden-benefit 
analysis likely would be central to the Supreme Court's analysis of 
the controversy. Those principles therefore provide the framework 
for discussion of the positive and negative attributes of the North­
field diversion. Because detailed, reliable evidence is unavailable, 
discussion will be general. Not coincidentally, the Supreme Court 
has adopted a similarly general approach. In adjudicating interstate 
water suits, the Court has looked to the overall tenor of the evidence 
and arguments presented: 
It is difficult for a court to decide issues of fact upon which experts 
equal in number and standing differ flatly and when their conclu­
sions rest on estimates upon the correctness of which the court, 
without technical knowledge, can not undertake to pass. In such 
cases, the court looks about for outstandingfactsfrom which the lay 
mind can safely draw inferences . ...203 
A. Possible Downstream Impacts ofthe Northfield Diversion 
The Swift River diversion that created Quabbin subtracts ap­
proximately two percent from the average flow of the Connecticut 
River.204 That fact was noted by the Supreme Court, whose ap­
proval of Quabbin was at least partially predicated on Massachu­
setts' declaration that it would adhere to the provisions of a project 
permit issued by the Army Corps of Engineers. That permit re­
quired Massachusetts to release water from Quabbin during periods 
of low river flow, thereby protecting the navigability and water qual­
ity of the lower Connecticut River.20S Significantly, the Court re­
frained from enjoining any future diversions in part because 
Massachusetts' "statements . . . clearly negative any threat, inten­
tion or purpose to make any diversion in excess of that specified or 
otherwise than as set forth in the determinations of the War 
Department."206 
The Northfield diversion would subtract an additional one per­
cent from the river's annual flOW.207 The combined effect of the es­
tablished and proposed diversions would result in a cumulative 
downstream flow reduction of approximately three percent. Thus, 
203. North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365, 385-86 (1923) (emphasis added). 
204. Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. at 666. 
205. Id at 665. 
206. Id at 674. 
207. KAYNOR, WATER ALLOCATION STUDY, supra note 41, at 58. 
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the Northfield diversion, if accomplished, apparently would violate 
the Supreme Court's 1931 decree by materially increasing the vol­
ume of diversion.208 Although the Court likely would find a suit 
premised solely on that contention to be without merit,209 that Con­
necticut opposed the creation of Quabbin could provide an impor­
tant foundation for Connecticut's claim in any litigation to block the 
proposed diversion. Certainly, Connecticut has not slept on its equi­
table rights2IO and thus should be permitted to adduce evidence of 
the cumulative impacts on Connecticut's interests of both past and 
impending diversions.211 
Preservation of the navigability of the Connecticut River is of 
substantial interest to Connecticut, particularly along the reach of 
the river below the fallline.212 As one illustration of that interest, 
several oil storage facilities south of Hartford are supplied chiefly by 
tankers that navigate the river for a distance greater than thirty 
miles. Any impairment to the navigability of the river could have 
two effects: Restriction of tanker access to the terminals and en­
hancement of the risks ofcollision and grounding. Correspondingly, 
those risks could enhance the danger of an oil spill in the river. 
There is other commercial use of the river for transportation in 
the reach south of Hartford, but available evidence suggests that the 
Massachusetts diversions, present and proposed, would create their 
most significant impacts during the spring, when river level is high 
and channel depth is not a major concem.213 Should Connecticut, 
however, be able to demonstrate that risks are created, however, that 
proof would be significant, for impairmen~ of navigability has been a 
pivotal issue in several of the interstate diversion cases.214 
When Connecticut brought suit against the Swift River diver­
sion in 1931, there was a hydroelectric power station on the Connect­
icut River, north of Hartford.2ls Although the Supreme Court 
208. See notes 147-48 supra and accompanying text. 
209. Were Connecticut to advocate an injunction based solely on the somewhat 
obscure language of the 1931 decree, the Court might find that advocacy to be merely an 
exercise ''to vindicate a barren right." Washington v. Oregon, 297 U.S. at 53. 
210. For the importance oflaches in interstate water cases, see note 164supra and 
accompanying text. 
211. See note 192 supra and accompanying text. 
212. The fall line of the Connecticut River is at Windsor Locks, Connecticut. See 
map, Appendix B. 
213. A similar discussion can be found in Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 
at 666. 
214. Id.; see note 127 supra. 
215. Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. at 667. 
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denied an injunction, the possible impact of a diversion upon the 
facility was accorded consideration.216 That facility no longer is in 
operation, but a smaller hydroelectric power station presently oper­
ates on the same reach of the river, at Windsor Locks.217 Two mu­
nicipal electric cooperatives218 are undertaking an expansion of that 
power station;219 when completed, the project would require an 
available river tlow of 1900 cfs.220 But because the present average 
tlow of the Connecticut River, as it enters Connecticut, is 15,900 
CfS,221 it is unlikely that an upstream diversion of the magnitude au­
thorized at Northfield would have any perceptible impact on the ex­
panded Windsor Locks hydroelectric power plant. 222 
At the present time, only industrial consumers in Connecticut 
use the river as a water supply.223 Because those users are few and 
because the cumulative tlow restriction caused by both present and 
planned diversions would be slight, no discernible impact will be im­
posed on these current industrial users. Although several studies in­
dicate that Connecticut communities will become dependent on the 
river as a municipal water source in the future,224 Connecticut would 
be unable to forcefully argue for protection of this substantial inter­
est. Even in the aftermath of the Federal Declaratory Judgment 
Act,225 the Supreme Court has held that protection of such indefinite 
future rights is beyond the proper scope of its adjudicatory power in 
interstate water diversion suits.226 
Connecticut has a more immediate interest in protecting the 
volume and quality of Connecticut River water, as those measures 
affect the river's ecological balance, recreational opportunities, and 
216. Id 
217. STATE OF CONNECTICUT OFFICE OF POLlCY AND MANAGEMENT, ENERGY: 
HYDROPOWER POLlCY AND REPORT (1981). 
218. Massachusetts Municipal Electric Energy Co-operative and Connecticut 
Wholesale Electric Co-operative. 
219. Letter from J. Home, State of Connecticut Office of Policy and Management, 
to Charles Stephenson (Sept. 28, 1981). 
220. Id 
221. BASIN COMM. COMPREHENSIVE INVESTIGATION, supra note 63, at D-2. 
222. Economic injury to commerce, and indirectly to consumers, was accorded 
substantial weight in Wisconsin v. Illinois, 278 U.S. 367, 408-09 (1929). 
223. The most significant industrial consumer is the Connecticut Yankee nuclear 
power facility in Haddam, which draws water from the river to cool its reactor core. 
224. See note 14 supra and accompanying text. See generally BASIN COMM. COM­
PREHENSIVE INVESTIGATION, supra note 63. 
225. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1976). 
226. Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. at 608; Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 
U.S. at 674. This premise is perhaps open to dispute. See 2 R. CLARK, supra note 20 
§ 130.2; notes 8-10 supra and accompanying text. 
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capacity to accept sewage and organic pollution. Under the doctrine 
of parens patriae ,227 Connecticut has a legal interest in protecting 
plant and animal life in the river, riverbed, and tloodplain.228 Sev­
eral threatened and endangered species have been identified in the 
Connecticut River basin,229 and should Connecticut demonstrate 
that those species' welfare and survival would be placed at risk by 
the proposed diversion, the Supreme Court might accord that evi­
dence considerable weight.230 
In the past, the Supreme Court's analysis of interstate water di­
version cases has been devoid of ecological considerations. The 
cases, however, were all decided before 1946 and, in the present era, 
the vulnerability of life forms and of the food chain to human inter­
ference may be more effectively raised before a court than in the 
past. In addition, the nation is now statutorily committed to protect­
ing all forms of life and preserving ecological balance.231 As with 
any modem technology, water diversions can disrupt the lives of 
both primitive and complex organisms. The intensity and breadth of 
any such disruptions, if demonstrable by objective evidence, could 
become a focal issue in a suit to block the Northfield diversion, be­
cause of heightened awareness of ecological impacts. 
Any substantial decrease in water quality could also reduce the 
recreational value of the Connecticut River. Connecticut currently 
227. The doctrine ofparens patriae permits Connecticut to bring suit in its role as 
trustee of the natural resources of the state. See generally Note, The Original Jurisdiction 
of the United States Supreme Court, II STAN. L. REv. 665 (1959). 
228. Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896), overruled on other grounds, Hughes 
v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979). 
229. The following is a list of threatened or endangered species indigenous to the 
Connecticut River basin: (I) Alasmidonta heterodon (mussel); (2) Goniohasis virginica 
(slug); (3) Crangonyx pseudogracilis (flea); (4) ACipenser hrevirostrum (sturgeon); 
(5) Acipenser oxyrhychus (sturgeon); (6) Falco peregrinus (falcon); (7) Haliaetus 
leucocephalus (bald eagle); (8) Ludwigia polycarpa (water herb); (9) Pandion haliaetus 
(osprey); (10) Salix interior (willow); and (II) Sagittaria cuneata (arrowhead plant). M. 
DeFalco, supra note 8, at 13; D. Smith, supra TABLE I, note e. 
Projects that require licensing or sponsorship by any branch of the federal govern­
ment implicate the prohibitions of the Endangered Species Conservation Act, 16 U.S.C. 
§§ 1531-42 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). For one illustration of the importance of the Endan­
gered Species Conservation Act, see Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978) 
(blocking completion of the Tellico Dam because of the dam's projected impact on the 
snail darter). 
230. See New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. at 345 (according weight to a diver­
sion's impact on oysters, though regarding oysters purely as a commercial resource); see 
also note 229 supra. 
231. National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-61 (1976 & Supp. V 
1981); see note 229 supra. 
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maintains seven parks on the banks of the river232 and stocks scores 
of Connecticut River tributaries with several species of sport fish.233 
Additionally, the river supports a large recreational boating fleet, 
and Connecticut maintains five major launching facilities along the 
main stem.234 While recreational uses have been accorded weight in 
only one of the prior interstate cases,23S the multiple use potential of 
water sources is an important concern today. Any provable impact 
on Connecticut's recreational uses of the river caused by the North­
field diversion might therefore be given substantial consideration by 
the Supreme Court. 
Connecticut joins the three upstream states236 in making sub­
stantial use of the Connecticut River as a waste disposal reposi­
tory.237 One dramatic effect of any decrease in river volume is the 
river's correspondingly reduced capacity to safely accept those 
wastes.238 Adequate volume is necessary to maintain water quality 
by keeping oxygen levels high, waste precipitation low, and waste 
concentrations within acceptable limitS.239 Should water quality be­
come inadequate, then legal as well as aesthetic considerations may 
preclude the continuation of Connecticut's present waste disposal 
practices.240 The Northfield diversion, by reducing river flow, would 
have a measurable impact on this waste disposal-water quality equa­
tion. Any demonstrable reduction in the river's capacity to accept 
wastes would have an immediate effect on the interests of Connecti­
cut citizens and could therefore provide Connecticut with a substan­
tiallegal argument against the Northfield diversion. 
In 1931, Connecticut argued that the Swift River diversion 
would diminish the Connecticut River shad run.241 The Supreme 
232. The seven parks are: Dart Island, Waldo, Gillette Castle, Haddam Island, 
Haddam Meadows, Hurd, and Selden Neck State Parks. STATE OF CONNECTICUT DEP'T 
OF TRANSP., OFFICIAL 1981-1982 TRANSPORTATION/REcREATION MAP (1981). 
233. See STATE OF CONNECTICUT DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTEC­
TION, CONNECTICUT FISHERIES PAMPHLET No.4: 1979-1980 CONNECTICUT TROUT 
STOCKING REpORT. 
234. STATE OF CONNECTICUT DEP'T OF TRANSP., OFFICIAL 1891-1982 TRANSPOR­
TATION/REcREATION MAP (1981). 
235. See New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. at 345. 

236.. New Hampshire, Vermont, and Massachusetts. See note 2 supra. 

237. See generally BASIN COMM. COMPREHENSIVE INVESTIGATION, supra note 63. 
238. See TABLE I supra, notes a, i-k. 
239. Id 
240. Both state and federal law may limit discharge of sewage, even when treated, 
into an overburdened body of water. See e.g. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1361 (1976 & Supp. V 
1981); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 25-26 (1981); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 25-54 a-yy (1981). 
241. Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. at 664. The shad, like the salmon, is 
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Court found that the proof offered to substantiate that allegation was 
insufficient.242 Largely because of increased pollution and river 
damming,243 and perhaps also because of the diversion, a decrease in 
the shad run did occur during the early decades of the twentieth cen­
tury. Recently, through the combined efforts of federal and state 
governments and private industry,244 the shad run has stabilized, and 
the shad fishery remains a commercially viable activity in the Con­
necticut River estuary. 
The Northfield diversion could substantially injure the shad 
run, indirectly, by increasing pollution concentrations. The North­
field diversion could also impede the shad run in two, more direct, 
ways. Periodic intensive diversion of water could cause disruption of 
the operation of the fish ladders necessary to the shad's upstream 
migration.24s Also, as suggested in one study, the diversion could 
create so much turbulence in the Northfield reach of the Connecticut 
River that the shad's sensory faculties might be distorted, causing 
many fish to become disoriented.246 Either of these effects could 
cause a reduction in the reproductive rate of the shad, with a resul­
tant impact on Connecticut's commercial shad fishery.247 In at least 
one interstate water suit, the Supreme Court considered such an in­
quiry to be of substantial relevance.248 
an anadramous fish, living most of its life in the ocean, but which ascends fresh water 
streams to spawn. 
242. Id at 667. 
243. The shad and salmon are unable to leap over either the Holyoke or Turners 
Falls dams on the Connecticut River, and cannot pass the dams without the aid of a fish 
ladder. 
244. See generally Anadramous Fish Conservation Act, 16 U.S.C. § 757 (1976 & 
Supp. IV 1980). One important participant in the Connecticut River Anadramous Fish 
program is Northeast Utilities, owner of the Northfield facility. N.U. has constructed fish 
ladders at both its Holyoke and Turners Falls facilities. 
245. A fish ladder is composed of a series of "stairs" over which a migrating fish 
may comfortably leap. Such a ladder is necessary at dams that exceed a certain height to 
permit fish to move upstream past the dam. In an effectively designed ladder, water is 
directed through a sluiceway in the dam at a rate that would roughly correspond to the 
natural rate ofBow over rapids with a length/drop ratio comparable to that of the ladder. 
Fluctuations in the depth of the impounded water could affect that rate of Bow, with a 
consequent impact on the success of the annual shad/salmon migration. 
246. Brower & Walford, Model Zeta, supra note 38. 
247. Seeid 
248. Injury to the oyster fishery in the Delaware River was one reason why the 
Supreme Court limited the volume of New York's diversion in New Jersey v. New York, 
283 U.S. at 345. 
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B. Hierarchy of Uses for Connecticut River Water 
It has been shown that Connecticut makes no present use of the 
Connecticut River for purposes of domestic water consumption, and 
little use of the river for industrial purposes. Connecticut uses the 
river primarily for recreation, navigation, and waste disposal. By 
contrast, the Northfield diversion would help satisfy the domestic, 
municipal,249 and industrial water supply needs of greater Boston.250 
Superficially, then, the MOC's plan to divert and consume Connecti­
cut River water appears to be a more beneficial and more favored 
use.2S1 
But underlying greater Boston's need for more consumable 
water are statistics that could prove to be the basis for compelling 
arguments against the Northfield diversion. A 1975 study in thirteen 
test communities of the MOC system252 found that an average of 
over 85,000 gallons of water per mile of pipe leaked from the distri­
bution network each day.253 The study found that in Boston alone 
approximately fifty million gallons were lost daily due to leaks and 
pipe ruptures.254 Another study, including the years through 1978, 
indicated that much of Boston's distribution system has not been re­
placed since 1890 and that in some instances, water pipes are totally 
decayed.25s The MOC study estimated that up to seventy-six million 
gallons of daily loss could be remedied by a system-wide repair pro­
249. Municipal uses of MOC water include firefighting, water supplies to schools 
and other municipal buildings, system flushing, and street cleaning. See KAYNOR, 
WATER ALLOCATION STUDY, supra note 41, at A3. 
250. The population of the MOC member communities was estimated to be ap­
proximately 2.3 million in 1980. Williams, Boston Water, supra note 43, at 7. 
251. Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. at 618,656. 
252. The study, popularly called the Curran Report, was funded by the MOC and 
executed by the Water Resources Research Center at the University of Massachusetts 
and Curran Assoc:ates of Northampton, Massachusetts. KAYNOR, WATER ALLOCATION 
STUDY, supra note 41, at 56. 
253. MASSACHUSETTS PuBLIC INTEREST RESEARCH GROUP, BOSTON IS LEAKING 2 
(1981) (available at Connecticut River Watershed Council library, Easthampton, Massa­
chusetts) [hereinafter cited as MASSPIRG, BOSTON REPORT). The estimates and projec­
tions of system leakage that were made in the Curran Report have been defended as 
statistically conservative. KAYNOR, WATER ALLOCATION STUDY, supra note 41, at AI­
A4. 
254. MASSPIRG, BOSTON REPORT, supra note 253, at 2-3. This figure is arrived at 
by multiplying the estimated daily consumption in Boston (143 mgd) by the percentage 
of that water estimated to be unmetered (46 percent). The product is then multiplied by 
the estimated percentage of unmetered water that is not beneficially consumed (76 
percent). 
255. Moynihan, An Examination of Urban Water Supply Systems: A Case Study of 
the Boston, Massachusetts Metropolitan Area, I J. PUB. & INT'L AFF. 86, 87 (1979). 
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gram.256 This level of waste probably has been reduced somewhat 
because most MOC member communities, with state aid, are under­
taking repair programs and are educating consumers on the benefits 
of conservation. One such program has resulted in a net savings of 
twenty-nine percent in per capita water consumption.257 Nonethe­
less, waste likely remains substantial. 
The Supreme Court, in several contexts, has held that waste and 
inefficiency are important considerations in the proper allocation of 
water rights among the states.258 Waste on the scale revealed in the 
MOC distribution system indicates that available water supplies are 
not being put to their most beneficial use. The potential for savings 
to be realized through consumer conservation carries a similar impli­
cation. Because the 1975 estimates of correctable daily losses ex­
ceeds the MOC's projection of yield from the Northfield 
diversion,259 more recent evidence of continued inefficiencies in the 
MOC distribution system would be central to any interstate litiga­
tion. That evidence would undermine any contention that Connecti­
cut River water would be put to its highest and best use through 
diversion and would also provide compelling proof of waste. 
C. 	 Comparison oj'Benefits and Burdens Resultingfrom the 
Northfield Diversion 
Partly because of their wastefulness in the use of available water 
supplies, the MOC member communities will soon need additional 
water. Several studies indicate that the MOC is already delivering 
more water than the safe yield260 of its sources,261 and that MOC 
members' demand for water is almost certain to increase.262 Popula­
256. MASSPIRG, BOSTON REPORT, supra note 253, at 2. The town of Arlington's 
per capita consumption dropped from 138 gallons per day in 1971 to 98 gallons per day 
in 1978, resulting in a town-wide savings in excess of $145,000 per year. Id 
257. 	 Id 
258. 	 See notes 106, 121, 186 supra and accompanying text. 
259. The MDC projects an average daily yield from Northfield of 72 mgd. See 
notes 55-57 supra and accompanying text. 
260. Safe yield is defined in many ways, but essentially, the term means the avail­
able volume of water that a source can provide during all but the most extreme periods of 
drought. See !(AYNOR, WATER ALLOCATION STUDY, supra note 41, at 50-52. 
261. 	 See e.g. SPECIAL STUDY COMMISSION, REPORT, supra note 7, at 4. 
262. See, e.g., Wallace, Floyd Associates, Inc., Planning Area (Sept. 1982) (draft 
report) (available at Water Supply Citizens Advisory Committee, Hadley, Massachu­
setts); WATER QUALITY TASK FORCE OF THE SPECIAL LEGISLATIVE COMMISSION ON 
WATER SUPPLY, CHEMICAL CONTAMINATION (Sept. 1979) [hereinafter cited as WATER 
QUALITY TASK FORCE). 
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tion in the MOC service area is presently 2.3 million.263 That figure 
will grow, not simply as the result of population growth in member 
communities, but also because of additions to the MOC roster of 
water service communities.264 Eastern Massachusetts' groundwater 
has become increasingly contaminated, particularly by road salt and 
the organic compound TCE,265 an industrial solvent. The MOC sys­
tem will likely absorb in the future, as it has in the past, area com­
munities whose municipal groundwater sources become unusable.266 
The Northfield diversion would then clearly benefit the MOC and its 
member communities by helping to satisfy expanding future 
demand. 
Should Connecticut seek to enjoin the diversion, the Supreme 
Court would accord considerable weight to projections of need for 
augmented water supply.267 But Connecticut, as it did in 1931, 
would likely argue that Boston's need for water should not automati­
cally translate into the need for Connecticut River water.268 At least 
one other viable source of supply for the MOe has been studied 
extensively: the Plymouth groundwater aquifer in southeastern 
Massachusetts.269 Though initially more costly, sinking wells into 
the Plymouth aquifer probably would yield a more reliable and 
purer water source than would the Connecticut River diversion.270 
263. Williams, Boston Water, supra note 43, at 7. 
264. There are several towns within fifteen miles of the State House in Boston that 
are not presently members of the MDC but that could become members without amend­
ing the water supply statute. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 92, § 10 (West 1969 & Cum. 
Supp. 1982-83). Several non-member towns in central Massachusetts also receive MDC 
water and that number could also conceivably increase as well. 
265: TCE is trichloroethylene. A 1979 study found significant TCE contamination 
in the water supply of several communities located within fifteen miles of the State 
House. The towns are: Bedford, Burlington, Canton, Danvers, Dedham, North Read­
ing, Norwood, Westwood, Wilmington, and Woburn. WATER QUALITY TASK FORCE, 
supra note 262. 
266. Bedford, Dedham, and Westwood are expected to join the MDC because of 
local supply contamination. Canton, Norwood, and Woburn have all become increas­
ingly dependent on the MDC as local supplies have become unusable. Id 
267. See, e.g., Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. at 664-65, 674. 
268. Id at 664. 
269. The Plymouth aquifer is a massive groundwater source containing water 
trapped in water-bearing gravel that overlays a layer of impermiable rock. Williams, 
Boston Water, supra note 43, at 10. 
270. The Corps of Engineers has speculated that the Plymouth aquifer could safely 
yield 300 mgd of pure water. Id There have been several other alternatives suggested, 
including siphoning water from the Merrimack and Sudbury Rivers. Though both flow 
through eastern Massachusetts, they are contaminated with large amounts of industrial 
chemicals and polluted by upstream sewage discharge; neither is a promising water 
source. It has also been suggested that Quabbin Reservoir could itself be made more 
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Other factors derogating from the Northfield diversion's bene­
fits to Boston area communities are the possible impacts of introduc­
ing Connecticut River water into the MOC system. Those impacts 
likely would include reducing the quality of Quabbin water, disrup­
tion of Quabbin ecology, and the consequent degradation of the 
quality of the water distributed for use through the MOC system.271 
While not injurious to Connecticut, those impacts would be nonethe­
less relevant to any assessment of the benefits to be derived from the 
proposed diversion. 
Greater Boston's need for augmented water supply, though not 
insubstantial, stands as the only clear benefit the Northfield diver­
sion could provide. As noted, the quality ofthat benefit has not gone 
unchallenged even in recipient communities,272 and the same benefit 
might be achieved by tapping alternative sources or curbing 
waste.273 It has also been shown that against the benefit of reducing 
the MOC's supply crisis is a substantial list of possible downstream 
injuries.274 
But while the MOC's needs are fairly clear, no accurate projec­
tions have been yet drawn of the Northfield diversion's likely impact 
on Connecticut River water quality, ecology, navigation, hydroelec­
tric power generation, waste disposal, recreation, and commercial 
fisheries. The MOC's Environmental Impact Report may provide 
accurate projections, though its primary focus will be on impacts 
within Massachusetts. Connecticut, of course, might undertake its 
own impact studies. 
Because the volume of diversion, past and proposed, represents 
only a small fraction of Connecticut River flow, any downstream im­
pacts would likely be subtle. Additionally, most of the issues likely 
to be raised in litigation to block the Northfield diversion would be 
subtle, at least in comparison to those raised by the titanic diversions 
and dry riverbeds at issue in many of the prior Supreme Court cases. 
Yet should Connecticut present reliable proof of MOC system waste, 
feasible supply alternatives and a broad range of injuries, however 
minor, the overall weight of evidence, when measured against the 
productive through judicious tree harvesting in its watershed, which would increase rain­
water runoff into the reservoir. 
271. See TABLE III supra, notes o-q. All MOe sources eventually commingle in 
the distribution system. 
272. See notes 252-66 supra and accompanying text. 
273. See TABLES I-III supra; notes 204-48 supra and accompanying text. 
274. New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. at 342. 
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dubiop-s benefits of the Northfield diversion, should justify an 
injunction. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The controversy over the Northfield diversion may never be 
presented for resolution by the Supreme Court of the United States. 
Massachusetts' Environmental Impact Report may prove the North­
field diversion to be practically and politically infeasible. Connecti­
cut's misgivings may be quieted by a reciprocal agreement, either 
informally or through a compact approved by Congress. Should in­
terstate litigation ensue, however, evidence would likely be devel­
oped, and arguments presented, within the framework described 
here. 
In such a suit, Connecticut would carry the heavy burden of 
proving, by clear and convincing evidence, substantial injury to its 
interests. The weight of that burden would be lessened to the extent 
that Connecticut could demonstrate that the Northfield diversion is 
unnecessary or that better alternatives exist. Connecticut should also 
be permitted to demonstrate that the cumulative impact of the ex­
isting and impending diversions would injure one or more of Con­
necticut's interests in the Connecticut River. The crucial elements in 
the presentation of Connecticut's case would be evidence of MDC 
system-wide waste, other available water sources, and downstream 
impacts on navigation, water quality, ecosystems, and commercial 
interests. Thorough development of this evidence would no doubt 
prove costly, but, if accomplished, persuasive. 
Regardless of its outcome, the Northfield diversion controversy 
carries substantial national implications. Potable water is becoming 
an increasingly scarce and valuable resource, and its allocation to 
one use, accomplished by modem technology, frequently makes it 
unavailable for other uses. That circumstance is particularly clear 
when water is permanently transferred out of its natural basin. 
Many areas, including metropolitan Boston, having insufficient sup­
plies of water to meet future demand. Unless these water deficient 
areas obtain new sources of supply or begin to practice effective con­
servation of water resources, population and economic growth will 
decline and could reverse. As available water supplies continue to 
dwindle, the Supreme Court will likely be thrust into a more active 
role in the interstate allocation of water. It is hoped that the Court 
will perceive that its decisions must not merely effect a fair distribu­
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tion of water among competing states, but also affirmatively protect 
water sources from overuse and further degradation. 
According to geologists, the Connecticut River flowed without 
human interference for millenia, shaping the geography and ecology 
of much of New England. The river has had a similar impact on life 
in New England since the first European settlements: Providing 
water, power, food, and an avenue of transportation for a developing 
culture. In such a light, Justice Holmes observed fifty years ago: "A 
river is more than an amenity, it is a treasure." If the Connecticut, 
already badly tarnished, is to remain such a treasure, future develop­
ment must be undertaken only with great caution. 
In the past, technological development has exacted a repeated 
and heavy toll on the vitality of the river. The implications of the 
Northfield diversion must be viewed from that perspective. The di­
version embodies many of the marvels of modem engineering and is 
intended to subtract only a small percentage from the flow of a 
mighty river. So too, it is designed to help satisfy a readily measura­
ble need for water. By contrast, the nature and extent of the project's 
possible downstream impacts are matters of speculation, difficult to 
predict and likely to be felt only in the future. But impacts there will 
be, and with those impacts will come further degradation of the Con­
necticut River. Any principled resolution of the Northfield contro­
versy must guard against such an outcome, husbanding the 
Connecticut River for the future, not simply partitioning its waters to 
satisfy present perceptions of need. 
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